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INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, China’s legislature took the
unprecedented step of amending its Labor Contract Law
(“LCL”)1 only four years after its enactment.2 The amendments,
which took effect in 2013, are limited in scope and address only
a few provisions of the LCL—those governing the use of workers
sourced from labor services agencies and the regulation of those
agencies (referred to herein as “temp agencies”).3 The reforms
are important in part because they deepen long-term trends in
China toward tighter regulations and higher labor costs.
Curiously, though perhaps not surprisingly, they are also
intended, in part, to secure protections that have been a focus of
Chinese labor law reform since China’s first nation-level Labor

1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (
[Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l.
People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S
CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter LCL]. The law is also translated alternatively as the
“Employment Contract Law” or “ECL”.
2. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (2012 Xiuzheng) (
(2012
)) [Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.) (2012 amendment)],
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2013, effective
July 1, 2012) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter LCL
Amendments].
3. See infra Part III. (discussing these provisions). As discussed below, the term
“dispatched workers” (laowu paiqian yuangong
) under the LCL actually
includes three separate categories of positions: “temporary,” “auxiliary,” and
) is
“substitute.” LCL, supra note 1, art. 66. The Chinese term, laowu paiqian (
frequently translated as “labor dispatch” and the sourcing agencies are often referred
to as the dispatching employer, “intermediary employment agencies”, or simply as
“temp agencies”.
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Law took effect in 1995,4 including “equal pay for equal work,”
employment on the basis of employment contracts, minimum
labor standards for all workers, and basic rules on length of
service, termination, and severance.5 The LCL amendments are,
therefore, the latest attempt to close implementation gaps that
have been a hallmark of labor law reform since its inception.
The persistence of implementation gaps—the divide
between the law on the books and the law in practice—in the
face of continued legislative and regulatory reforms is a
consistent focal point of regulatory scholars in law, sociology,
and public administration, 6 as well as observers of China’s
reform path. 7 The 2013 amendments offer a renewed
opportunity to examine this fundamental question as it plays out
in labor and employment law. In short, why have two major
legislative reforms, the 1995 Labor Law and the 2008 reforms
that introduced the LCL and related legislation, as well as
numerous implementing measures adopted by courts,
legislatures, and regulators at the national and subnational
levels, failed to change basic labor practices? Given this history,
is this most recent effort likely to succeed?

4. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa (
) [Labor
Law (P.R.C.)], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong. (P.R.C.),
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Labor Law].
5. See, e.g., Labor Law, art. 46 (requiring equal pay for equal work); id. ch. 3
(regarding labor contracts); id. chs. 5–6 (regarding working conditions and
occupational safety and health); id. arts. 20–32 (regarding contract term, termination,
and dissolution). For a more complete comparison of the Labor Law and the LCL, see
infra Part II.B.
6. See generally, e.g., FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND “PUNISH OR
PERSUADE” (1997); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Lesley K. McAllister et al.,
Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement in Industrializing Countries, 32 LAW & POL’Y 1
(2010) (assessing approaches to environmental law enforcement).
7. See generally, e.g., IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2000); Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The
Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L. J.
1050 (2006) (surveying challenges to labor law enforcement); Benjamin van Rooij &
Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of
China’s Industrial Pollution Law, 32 L. & POL’Y 14 (2010) (identifying similar challenges
to environmental law enforcement).
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Theories of legal recursivity, developed initially by Terence
Halliday and Bruce Carruthers,8 offer a useful framework for
understanding the dynamic interplay between law and its
implementation. They observe that legal change proceeds
through iterative cycles of lawmaking and implementation that
are kept in tension by four drivers or mechanisms: the
indeterminacy of law, the ideological and structural
contradictions internalized in law, “diagnostic” struggles among
competing actors involved in the legislative process, and
mismatches between the actors involved in lawmaking and those
tasked with implementation.9 At their most basic, these recursive
cycles move from statutes or court decisions to practice to new
statutes or further decisions, or from regulation to compliance
experience to further regulations. 10 In addition to factors
endogenous to the recursive cycle itself, exogenous factors, such
as triggering events or global pressures, also shape the process of
legal change.11
As detailed in Part II below, the new amendments represent
the latest stage of a recursive reform process. They also respond
to a phenomenon widely observed by academics and
policymakers over the past several decades—a near-universal
increase in the nonstandard workforce worldwide.12 Despite the
8 . These theories were developed initially in studies of global commercial
lawmaking and draw heavily on neo-institutional perspectives of legislative reform. See
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 45–62 (1998);
Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making
and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC.
1125 (2007).
9. Id. at 1149–53. See Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity in Legal Change:
Lawyers and Reforms of China’s Criminal Procedure Law, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY. 911, 913–
14 (2009) (elaborating on the theory).
10. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1144.
11. Id. at 1145–46.
12 . For a comprehensive review of these trends, see Arne L. Kalleberg,
Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-time, Temporary and Contract Work, 26 ANN. REV.
SOC. 341, 341 (2000) (defining “nonstandard work arrangements” as “part-time work,
temporary employment, and contract work”). On US trends, see, for example,
AMERICAN STAFFING ASSOC., AMERICAN STAFFING 2012: STRUCTURAL SHIFT?, STAFFING
SUCCESS 10 (2012), available at http://www.americanstaffing.net/statistics/pdf/
AmericanStaffingAnnualAnalysis_2012.pdf (observing a 45% increase in temp agency
employment since 2009, following a 38% decline during the financial crisis); Katherine
V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers without
Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (2006)
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many labels used to describe them,13 all of these arrangements
lack one or more of the hallmarks of standard employment: fulltime work for an indefinite period that is performed at the
employer’s place of business under the employer’s direction.14
Hiring through temp agencies and other intermediaries has
contributed significantly to these trends, as employers look to
reduce their regulatory burden, outsource responsibility for
human resources functions, lower labor and benefit costs, and
gain the flexibility they need to quickly respond to shifts in
market demand.15 In many jurisdictions, the growth of the labor
services industry has been spurred by deregulatory policies
intended to facilitate its use as a catalyst for job creation and
increased productivity.16
Strictly speaking, of course, workers sourced through temp
agencies need not in fact be temporary. Such workers are
employed under an employment contract with a labor services
agency, typically for a fixed term, and then assigned to perform
[hereinafter Stone, Atypical Employees]; Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization,
Globalization, and Privatization: Three Challenges to Labour Rights in Our Time, 44
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 77 (2006); Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United
States, 18 COMP. LAB. L. J. 503 (1997); Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work
Force: The Key Challenges & Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 867 (1995). In
2005, the Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal devoted a symposium issue to the
topic. See Symposium, Bridging The Past and the Future: A Symposium on Comparative Labor
Law, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2005).
13. Common terms include “nonstandard employment relations,” “alternative
work arrangements,” “market-mediated arrangements,” “nontraditional employment
relations,” “flexible staffing arrangements,” “flexible working practices,” “atypical
employment,” “vagrant or peripheral employment,” “vulnerable work,” “precarious
employment,” and “disposable” or “contingent” work. See Kalleberg, supra note 12, at
341 (reviewing the literature).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., RICHARD CARLSON & SCOTT A. MOSS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 8 (3d ed.
2013) (discussing some of the common drivers of growing demand for dispatched
workers and increases in other outsourcing practices).
16. See, e.g., Bernd Waas, A Quid Pro Quo in Temporary Agency Work: Abolishing
Restrictions and Establishing Equal Treatment—Lessons to Be Learned from European and
German Labor Law?, 34 COMP. L. & POL’Y J. 47–51 (2012) (discussing the deregulation
of temporary agency work across Europe and under the 2008 European Union
Directive on Temporary Agency Work); Gyeongjoon Yoo & Changhui Kang, The Effect
of Protection of Temporary Workers on Employment Levels: Evidence from the 2007 Reform of
South Korea, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 578, 580–83 (2012) (discussing the rationale
for expansion of temporary hiring and similar trends in South Korea); Masanori
Kuroki, The Deregulation of Temporary Employment & Workers’ Perceptions of Job Insecurity,
65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560 (2012) (analyzing the impact of deregulation in Japan).
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services, which may be on a short-term or longer basis, for
another firm (i.e. the “using” or “receiving” firm) under the
terms of a labor services contract between that firm and the
temp agency.17 At the same time, the term “temporary workers”
includes those hired directly by an employer on a contingent or
part-time basis. Accordingly, although the term “temp workers”
is a convenient shorthand for all workers sourced from a temp
agency, this Article uses the more literal terms “labor dispatch”
and “dispatched workers” to avoid the impression that all such
workers are in temporary positions.18
For employees, temp agency hiring can offer flexible work
arrangements and the prospect of transitioning to long-term
employment, as well as the opportunity to gain experience and
skills.19 However, hiring through intermediaries generally offers
employees lower wages and benefits, lower wage stability, and
greater risk of workforce reductions in an economic downturn.20
Prior empirical work also confirms that labor dispatch creates
structural disincentives to training investments,21 and that high
rates of short-term employment, including some forms of labor
dispatch, can worsen high turnover rates, increase employee
vulnerability, and further weaken the mutual commitment of
employers and their workers.22 Other studies have demonstrated
a correlation between the use of labor dispatch and other
nonstandard work with heightened workplace accident rates.23
The social effects of an over-reliance on labor dispatch and
17. For a detailed description of these arrangements, see infra Part II.C.
18. See supra note 3 (regarding variations).
19. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A
Historical and Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L.
153, 161 (2003) (discussing incentives for contingent work arrangements).
20. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS
LIMITATIONS 28 (2d ed. 2011). See Luo et al., The Expanding Role of Temporary Help
Services from 1990 to 2008, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 2010, at 4, 12 (measuring volatility
of losses and gains in the labor services sector during the recession and following);
MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (2d ed. 2010)
(discussing disparities and uncertain application of employment laws).
21. Timothy J. Bartkiw, Baby Steps? Toward the Regulation of Temporary Help Agency
Employment in Canada, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 163, 175 (2009) (surveying the
literature).
22. See Arturo Bronstein, Trends and Challenges of Labour Law in Central Europe, in
GLOBALIZATION & THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 191, 207 (John D.R. Craig & S. Michael
Lynk eds., 2006) (discussing the negative impacts of temporary work).
23. Id.
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other nonstandard forms of employment on gender imbalances,
employee productivity, and morale are equally troubling. 24
These factors are not conducive to innovation or the
development of the highly trained yet nimble workforce that
China and other nations hope to produce.
The growth of the labor services industry and the expansion
of the nonstandard workforce more broadly therefore raise
difficult legal questions about: (i) the permissibility of disparities
in the terms and conditions of employment for standard and
nonstandard workers; (ii) the allocation of responsibility for
compliance with labor and employment laws between the
sourcing and the requesting firm; and (iii) more fundamentally,
how “employer” and “employee” should be defined and
interpreted under regulatory regimes designed with standard
employment relationships in mind. 25 In China, as in other
jurisdictions, the resolution of these questions is critical to the
effective implementation of protective legislation that benefits
all workers, not only just dispatched workers.
China’s reforms must be understood in a broader global
context. In the United States, legislatures and courts have
largely sought to adapt existing labor and employment law and
regulations to address nonstandard employment, with mixed
success. 26 More expansive reforms are being introduced in
emerging markets. In the past five years, Mexico, South Korea,
and governments in Europe have adopted new legislation that
24. The disproportionate impact of informalization on gender disparities in the
workplace is well-documented. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the
Contingent Workforce, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 744 (1995). Empirical evidence also
substantiates the profound negative attitudinal and social impacts created by
heterogeneity in employment arrangements among employees of a common employer.
See Joseph P. Broschak & Alison Davis-Blake, Mixing Standard Work & Nonstandard
Deals: The Consequences of Heterogeneity in Employment Arrangements, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J.
371, 372 (2006) (investigating the impact of disparities between standard and
temporary work arrangements among workers at two US locations of a multinational
financial services firm).
25. See Befort, supra note 19, at 153, 158–60, 164–71 (discussing these challenges
within the US regulatory framework). On the limits of status-based employment
legislation, see generally Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee
When it Sees One and How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295
(2001).
26. See generally Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 12 (surveying the application
of U.S. employment laws to temp agency hired and other nonstandard workers);
Befort, supra note 19, at 164–70 (same).
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explicitly addresses legal protections for workers hired through
temporary agencies. 27 These reforms follow similar changes in
the early 2000s introduced in many Latin American countries
that by some estimates represent a “reversal of the trend towards
informality,” with new measures that limit temporary contracts,
regulate subcontracting, and restore or create minimum wage
standards.28
China’s first major step in the same direction began with
the enactment in 2008 of the LCL itself, which contained new
provisions on labor dispatch and other forms of nonstandard
work. 29 Recent empirical studies offer evidence of the
effectiveness of the LCL in promoting longer-term employment
relationships, improved compliance with labor contracting
mandates, and broader public awareness of legal protections for
workers.30 However, other evidence indicates that while these
impressive gains may have improved legal protections for
standard workers, the LCL’s passage has in fact deepened the
informalization of the Chinese workforce. 31 This evidence

27. On recent reforms in Mexico and South Korea, see infra Part V. On European
reforms, see generally Waas, supra note 16. See also Bronstein, supra note 22, at 207–10
(discussing efforts to address the problems caused by temp agency hiring and the
challenges of outsourcing to independent contractors who are in fact dependent on
the hiring firm).
28 . Simon Deakin, The Contribution of Labour Law to Economic & Human
Development, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 156, 167–70 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille,
eds. 2011).
29. LCL, supra note 1.
30 . See generally Mary Gallagher et al., China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law:
Implementation and Implications for China’s Workers (Inst. for the Study of Labor
Discussion Paper No. 7555 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318736
(presenting the results of a longitudinal study based on urban household survey data
and a national survey of 1600 manufacturing firms conducted by the People’s Bank of
China); see also Cheng Yanyuan & Yang Liu, “Laodong Hetongfa” Shishi Dui Woguo Qiye
Renli Ziyuan Guanli de Yingxiang: Jiyu Renli Ziyuan Jingli de Guandian [The Impact of the
Labor Contract Law’s Enforcement on Chinese Enterprises’ Human Resources Management –
Based on the Perspective of HR Managers], 7 JINGJI LILUN YU JINGJI GUANLI [ECON.
THEORY & BUS. MGMT.] 66 (2010) (finding that the LCL has led to an increase in the
use and term of written contracts and the number of indefinite-term contracts, as well
as to greater care in recruiting and hiring decisions); Fan Cui et al., The Effects of the
Labor Contract Law on the Chinese Labor Market, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 462 (2013)
(concluding that the LCL resulted in higher wage and benefit growth and greater labor
market rigidity).
31. See infra Part II. These trends are explored further in Albert Park & Fang Cai,
The Informalization of the Chinese Labor Market, in FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO

2014]

RECURSIVITY OF REFORM

981

indicates that many employers in China have substituted
dispatched workers for standard hires on a wholesale basis
precisely to avoid the perceived risks and costs of compliance
with employment laws and regulations. 32 The extent of this
substitution effect has not been fully accounted for in prior
studies on the LCL’s impact precisely because of the many
barriers to identifying the scale and scope of the nonstandard
workforce.33 By allowing labor dispatch to be used as a means of
creative compliance and continued evasion, the LCL has in fact
limited the degree to which the standards originally set by the
Labor Law and the LCL are realized across the Chinese
economy.
This Article draws on theories of legal recursivity to analyze
the LCL amendments and new implementing rules that took
effect in March 2014, which represent the latest stage of China’s
decades-long project of labor law reform.34 Part I begins with an
introduction to the recursivity framework and the protections
already available to dispatched employees under the LCL.
Integrating findings from the literature on regulatory
compliance, it observes that the incentive structures embedded
in the LCL and what we refer to as the “regulatory distance”—
INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A CHANGING CHINA 17 (Mary
E. Gallagher et al., eds., 2011).
32. For empirical evidence of the substitution effect of temp hires, see infra Part
II.C. Similar motivations also affect employers in the United States. See Befort, supra
note 19, at 158–60, 164–71 (calling contingent work a regulatory “black hole” because
such workers fall outside the safety net that the regulations provide for employment
relationships).
33. The most comprehensive study of the LCL’s implementation of which we are
aware is the study by Gallagher, et al., supra note 30. Its authors acknowledge the
limitations of their survey instrument in distinguishing standard and dispatched
employees. Id. at 16 n.9. They also recognize that the employment effects of tougher
LCL implementation may have been muted since firms are evading the LCL’s
requirements by expanding hiring through labor dispatch. Id. at 30. The lack of any
formal registration requirement for temp agencies in China prior to the recent
amendments has also impeded accurate evaluation of the true scale of labor dispatch in
China since 2008. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (acknowledging the lack of
precise figures).
34. A draft of the implementing rules was released for public comment on August
7, 2013, with the final version issued in early 2014. PRC Ministry of Human Resources
and Social Security (“MOHRSS”), Laowu Paiqian Zanxing Guiding (
) [Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch] (promulgated by the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security (P.R.C.), Jan. 24, 2014, effective Mar. 1, 2014)
[hereinafter Labor Dispatch Provisions], available at www.mohrss.gov.cn .
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that is, how far the demands of the new legislation diverge from
current norms in the target population—have deepened the
informalization of the workforce in China, despite the contrary
goals of the LCL. We argue that these new dimensions of
recursive legal reform might enrich the existing theoretical
framework. Part III proposes further implementing measures
that, if adopted at the national or local level, might better
advance the amendments’ stated goals and “wind down” the
recursive cycle. The Article adopts a comparative perspective
throughout, particularly with reference to relevant aspects of US
law, and concludes by placing China’s ongoing labor reform
experiment in the context of recent efforts by governments in
both emerging and developed economies to address the
regulatory challenges created by the informalization of labor.
I. RECURSIVE LEGAL REFORM & THE INFORMALIZATION OF
LABOR
The informalization of the Chinese workforce in its many
forms can be traced back to the early years of the reform
period. 35 Hiring through temp agencies, a key part of this
informalization, has itself been an established employment
model since the 1970s, when foreign representative offices were
first required to hire exclusively through third-party agencies.36
However, as we explain below, labor dispatch has expanded
dramatically since the passage of the LCL.
According to the most recent estimates by the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”), more than 60 million,
or one-fifth, of China’s 300 million urban employees are now
35. See Park & Cai, supra note 31, at 17, 20 (defining “informal” employment as
work that is “often temporary, lacks a formal contract, and does not provide social
insurance benefits or other worker protections”).
36. This requirement was formalized in the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Guowuyuan Guanyu Guanli Waiguo Qiye Changzhu Daibiao Jigou de Zanxing Guiding
(
[Interim
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Control of Resident
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council, Oct.
30, 1980, effective Oct. 30, 1980) (P.R.C.), and by Guanyu Waiguo Qiye Changzhu
Daibiao Jigou Dengji Guanli Banfa (
)
[Administrative Measures for the Registration of Resident Representative Offices of
Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Administration for Industry &
Commerce, Mar. 15, 1983, effective Mar. 15, 1983) art. 11 (P.R.C.).
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dispatched workers. 37 By comparison, the percentage of all
nonstandard workers in the United States, of which labor
services hires are a subset, is currently around twenty percent of
the workforce. 38 Although temp agency hiring has nearly
doubled since the 1990s, it still accounts for less than two
percent of total employment in the United States.39
Before the recent reforms took effect in 2013, dispatched
workers accounted for anywhere from one-third to as high as
seventy percent of the workforce for many firms, including stateowned enterprises (“SOE”) and foreign-invested firms alike.40
37. Accurate estimates are hard to come by. These figures come from a widely
cited report of the Economic Observer quoting the results of a 2011 study of labor
dispatch by China’s national labor union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(“ACFTU”). See Jiang Wenzhang, Quanwei Baogao Cheng “Laowu Paiqian” Da 6000wan
Ren QuanZong Jianyi Xiugai Laodong Hetongfa (
6000
) [Authoritative Report Says “Labor Dispatch” Workers Reach 60 Million,
)
ACFTU Recommends Amending the Labor Contract Law] JINGJI GUANCHA (
[ECONOMIC OBSERVER] (Feb. 25, 2011). The ACFTU report analyzed data obtained in
2010. More conservative estimates by the MOHRSS for 2009 reported only 27 million
dispatched workers.
38. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that as of September, 2013, the total
part-time workers and those employed in temporary help services accounted for
approximately 20% of the employed workforce. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The
Employment
Situation
(Sept.
2013),
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit
_10222013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 BLS Employment Report]; Befort, supra note 19, at
159 (citing sources from the 1990s putting the figure near thirty percent).
39. As of September, 2013, employment in “temporary help services” accounted
for a seasonally-adjusted 1.2% of the employed labor force. 2013 BLS Employment
Report, supra note 38. This figure is similar to 2008 levels, which take into account
disproportionate job losses among temp agency hires in 2007 and 2008. Luo et al.,
supra note 20, at 4, 12. The number of workers sourced via staffing agencies has
continued to grow in recent years, accounting for upwards of fifty percent of newly
created positions. Ben Baden, Larger Temporary Workforce Could be the New Normal, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 7, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/
articles/2011/11/17/larger-temporary-workforce-could-be-new-normal (citing the
Bureau of Labor Statistics on the size of the temporary workforce from 2009 to 2011).
These figures represent the number of contingent, contractual, seasonal, freelance,
just-in-time or “temp” workers who are hired under contract with a staffing agency that
supplies them to a requesting firm. Luo et al., supra note 20, at 1 (following the
definition of the “temporary help services industry” used by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics).
40. See In China, a Growing Demand for Temps, BUS. WK., Mar. 12, 2012, at 16
(citing sources estimating that 70% of the workforce of some state sector employers,
including Sinopec and China Telecom, are temp workers) [hereinafter Growing
Demand]; China Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-laboridUSBRE8BR04120121228. (citing estimates placing temp hiring levels in foreigninvested firms at one-third to half); see also Jiang Yunzhang, Labor Contract Law to Be
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Indeed, SOEs and other public employers, such as state
agencies, universities, public hospitals, and financial institutions,
have relied the most heavily on labor dispatch.41 Clearly, the
phenomenon is not limited to low-skilled manufacturing labor.
In fact, according to the ACFTU report, dispatched workers
have been more heavily employed in service industries such as
medicine, banking, finance, and telecommunications. 42
Underemployed college graduates accounted for nearly half of
all dispatched workers surveyed in one study by the Guangdong
Provincial Federation of Trade Unions in 2012.43
Macroeconomic shifts offer a partial explanation for these
numbers. Labor costs in China have risen exponentially over the
past decade, driven in part by labor shortages in traditional
urban manufacturing centers, tougher grassroots demands from
a new generation of migrant workers, and changing
development policies that require increased domestic
purchasing power to offset weakness in foreign export markets.44
As in the West, labor dispatch has enabled many employers to
reduce the cost of social insurance and other benefits. 45
Increased demand for flexible, cost-effective hiring models has
also contributed to informalization, as employers attempt to
keep up with seasonal consumer demand and just-in-time
inventory practices. But understanding the rapid growth of labor
dispatch and its connection to the compliance gaps that
continue to drive scandals and protest requires a closer look at
the path of Chinese labor law reform itself.

Revised, ECON. OBSERVER (Mar. 27, 2012) (reporting that sixty percent of companies in
the finance industry use seconded workers).
41. See Jiang, Authoritative Report, supra note 37 (reporting on industry trends
contained in the ACFTU survey).
42. Id.
43. INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNION CONFEDERATION HONG KONG LIAISON OFFICE,
ACFTU MADE SECOND APPEAL TO THE NPC TO REGULATE AGENCY WORK (2012),
available at http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/010312.html [hereinafter IHLO
Report].
44. See, e.g., Gordon Feng & Kay Cai, Delays Ahead: Why New Labour Rules Raise
Stress Levels, 26 CHINA L. & PRAC. 7 (June 2012) (“Many provinces and cities announced
[a] double salary plan in 2010 targeted at doubling employees’ average income within
five years, or a 15% increase each year” in order to spur consumption-driven growth).
45. See, e.g., CARLSON & MOSS, supra note 15, at 8 (observing that contingent
workers in the United States commonly receive reduced benefits). On the Chinese
context, see infra notes 126–31and accompanying text.
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A. Recursivity & Legal Reform
The LCL amendments are only the latest in a series of
legislative reforms over the past decade, some quite innovative,
that have, on balance, strengthened legal protections and
remedies available to Chinese workers. 46 Nonetheless, as
discussed below, these most recent reforms, and in fact the LCL
itself, in many respects only reemphasize and reinforce
requirements found in pre-existing labor and employment law:
“equal pay for equal work,” hiring by written contract, basic
labor standards, and rules on dismissals and severance.47
Halliday and Carruthers’ theory of recursivity offers a way to
understand why reforms may fail to “take” initially and also
helps identify factors that might raise the chance of success for
later reforms. Their theory sees the relationship between formal
law—the law on the books—and implementation—law in
action—not as a simple linear or causal relationship, but as a
dynamic, recursive social process.48 Accordingly, law in practice
is both an outcome of the legislative process and a catalyst for
future lawmaking.49
Recursive cycles of legal change can be explained, they
posit, by four primary drivers or mechanisms that produce gaps
between formal law and its implementation that then necessitate
and shape the direction of further reforms. Indeterminacy refers
to the inherent ambiguity, vagueness, and gaps in legislation, as
well as conflicts with other regulations, statutes, or cases. 50
Contradictions refers to underlying economic, political, or
ideological divides (collectively, “ideological contradictions”)
and “structural contradictions” among competing lawmaking or
implementation organizations within the state.51 Recursivity is
also caused by diagnostic struggles in the process of lawmaking or
implementation among contesting parties who disagree about
46. See infra Part II (surveying some of these changes). A full treatment of these
reforms is beyond the scope of this article. Many are detailed in RONALD C. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA (2008).
47. See supra note 5.
48. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1142; Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at
912.
49. See Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 27, at 1146.
50. See Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 914; Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at
1149.
51. See Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1149.
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the appropriate identification of the problem at hand and
therefore, about its solution. 52 Finally, legal change can be
stymied by actor mismatch, which occurs when there is a wide
disparity between the actors involved in lawmaking and those
involved in its implementation, resulting in resistance or
distortion in the implementation phase by those excluded from
the law-making process. 53 Of course, law-making is generally
undertaken by legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies,
while implementation involves a broader range of actors and
includes statutory interpretation, the daily work of legal
professionals, the function of enforcement agencies and other
authorities, and the response of individuals and entities to
whom the law is applied.54
Halliday and Carruthers also observe that exogenous
factors, such as pressure from international actors and trading
partners or triggering events, such as a scandal or crisis, can start
the reform cycle and affect its progress.55 Exogenous factors are
particularly salient in labor and employment law reform, since
labor and employment is inextricably linked to the health of
local and global markets, demographic and social changes, and
political shifts. Indeed, observers note that the history of labor
law reform in the West, and more recently, in Latin America,
Eastern Europe, and Asia, is evidence that “the principal
institutions of labour law–the individual employment
relationship, collective bargaining and social insurance–have
evolved in parallel with the emergence of labour markets in
market economies.”56 Recursive cycles of national law reform
52. Id. at 1150–51.
53. Id. at 1152–53.
54. Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 914.
55. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1146–47 (discussing these factors as
both contextual and stimulative). This comports with the observations of scholars in
political science and public administration on the drivers of policy cycles. See, e.g.,
James L. True et al., Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in
Public Policymaking, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 155, 160 (Paul A. Sabatier ed.,
2d ed. 2007) (explaining major policy shifts or policy “punctuations” as the product of
both endogenous and exogenous triggers).
56. See Deakin, supra note 28, at 162, 167–71 (tracing reforms in Latin America
and Eastern Europe) (citation omitted); see also Bob Hepple, Factors Influencing the
Making and Transformation of Labour Law in Europe, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra
note 28, at 37–40 (examining the influence of labor movements and civil society in
shaping labor law in Europe).
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may also be strongly influenced by global efforts at norm
construction that can affect the momentum, content, and
trajectory of domestic legal reform.57
Comparative labor and employment law offers numerous
examples of the dynamics Halliday and Carruthers observe.
Indeed, their work was inspired by studies of a series of 19th
century reforms known as the English Factory Acts that were
enacted and replaced in turn as the initial attempts to address
the sweatshop factory conditions of the Industrial Revolution
were defeated by limited regulatory capacity or active
resistance. 58 Employment discrimination law in the United
States, which began with early executive orders, carried through
until the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and ultimately, led to the
implementation of Title VII, offers another example of recursive
reform. 59 Although neither we nor Halliday and Carruthers
espouse any notion of evolutionary development paths as an
outcome of recursive reform, there are many resemblances
between the cycles of reform experienced in the West and the
ongoing reform of Chinese labor and employment law.
The recursive reform model emphasizes that the legislative
goals reflected in the early stages of a reform cycle may be
redefined as the law is implemented, and that recursive cycles
are in fact a process of norm formation rather than a linear path
toward a fixed goal; reinterpretations or reformulations of
existing norms, not all of which are necessarily explicit in law,
may emerge in practice and may ultimately be incorporated
formally by legislation later in the cycle (or not).60 Thus, it may
be difficult to observe without the benefit of hindsight what the
outcome or end point of a given cycle might be. This is
particularly true in the Chinese case where the reform process
spans decades and is shaped by changes in national and
subnational leadership and policy priorities.

57. See Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1173.
58. Id. at 1144.
59. Id.
60. As originally conceived, Halliday and Carruthers explored the intersections of
global norm-making at the international level among states and institutions and statelevel legislation. See id. at 1137–38, 1141–43 (surveying the literature on the
intersections of legal change and normative or social change).
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The remainder of this Part analyzes the LCL, its
implementation, its amendment in 2012, and the amendments’
recent implementing rules, as iterations in a recursive reform
cycle. While recognizing the complex political and institutional
forces behind the reform process, we nonetheless believe that
each stage of formal legal reform in China can be viewed, at
least since the passage of the Labor Law in 1994, as directed at
conforming employment practice and accepted norms to the
broad goals outlined at the start of this Section, which have
remained largely constant over the past two decades. Applying a
recursivity framework offers insights into why recent reforms
appear to be largely covering old ground and suggests whether
the most recent reforms are likely to affect employment
practice.
As explored below, China’s labor reform project can be
partially explained in terms of the four mechanisms identified
by Halliday and Carruthers. Although less explicit in the
following discussion, exogenous factors also play a role. For
example, global actors such as multinational corporations,
transnational NGO networks, and international organizations,
such as the International Labour Organization (“ILO”),
exercise continued influence and have the opportunity to
inform both the law-making and implementation sides of the
equation. The global financial crisis has certainly impacted
recent policy debates on labor reform in China,61 and each cycle
of labor law reform has also been spurred by local scandals that
directly shaped policy debates.62
However, two critical drivers not captured in Halliday and
Carruthers’ model also appear to have perpetuated the recursive
cycle. As explained in Part III, incorporating these factors into
the recursivity model adds, we believe, both explanatory and
predictive power to the framework. First, the LCL’s tougher
worker
protections
altered
employer
incentives
by
61. The financial crisis sparked renewed attention within China and abroad to the
need for a policy shift away from export-dependent growth and toward stronger
domestic consumption. The latter approach requires sustained local incomes, which
strengthens advocates of higher wages and benefits.
62. ’The passage of the LCL was spurred, in part, by a scandal over illegal forced
labor at brick kilns in Shanxi Province. See Virginia E. Harper Ho, From Contracts to
Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation under China’s New Labor Legislation, 23
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 73 n.167 (2009).
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simultaneously raising labor costs, increasing penalties for
noncompliance, while it also expanded labor dispatch and other
alternative hiring practices as a less costly means of formal
compliance. Second, the “regulatory distance” between the
standards set by the LCL and dominant compliance norms in
the economy was wide, which produced a longer and more
uncertain implementation phase.
We use the term “regulatory distance” to refer to a measure
of the magnitude of change that must occur for compliance
norms, as reflected by common understandings and practices in
the relevant industry and jurisdiction, to conform to the letter
and spirit of the new legal rule. It is therefore distinct from the
concept of compliance gaps, which focuses on how far an
individual firm’s conduct diverges from legal requirements. In
this Article, we identify regulatory distance at a more general
level. 63 Nonetheless, we suggest that it might readily be
measured by using a combination of (i) objective factors, such as
estimated compliance costs, the estimated length of time market
actors anticipate will be required for average firms to achieve
full compliance, and the frequency and severity of violations of
pre-existing legal rules in the pre- and post-reform periods; and
(ii) subjective factors, such as the level of opposition voiced by
firms during the drafting process and the post-reform reaction
voiced by compliance-minded firms. Future studies might
examine how these and other factors might best operationalize
regulatory distance as a construct. The following Part applies
recursivity theory to examine how Chinese labor law itself has
contributed to the informalization of labor and to consider the
potential effect of the 2013 LCL amendments.
B. The Labor Contract Law: Too Much Too Soon?
The current regulatory framework of Chinese labor law was
formally instituted at the national level in 1994 with the passage
of the Labor Law. 64 However, in reality, the Labor Law replaced
a vast body of administrative regulations adopted much earlier
in the reform period, which are perhaps rightly viewed as the
63. We assume that regulatory distance will always exist if the reform is intended
to change behavior.
64. Labor Law, supra note 4.
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initial stage of labor law reform. 65 In 2008, the LCL and two
related laws adopted in 2007 together marked a watershed as the
first national effort to revamp labor and employment legislation
since 1994. 66 Although each measure has been shaped by
differing policy goals and new provisions have been introduced
to respond to changing circumstances, it is striking how much of
the content of the LCL and its amendments, discussed below,
either repeat verbatim or are directed at shoring up
requirements long established in the 1995 Labor Law, such as
the written contract requirement, employer obligations to pay
social insurance benefits, 67 limits on excessive overtime,
prohibitions on abusive employment practices, and an “equal
pay for equal work” mandate.68
Many of the factors identified by Halliday and Carruthers
offer a partial explanation for this recursive cycle. First, the
Labor Law, like many national-level basic laws (jiben fa
),
was drafted in fairly broad terms and then fleshed out by later
65. Id. On this history, see generally HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOUR LAW IN CHINA:
CHOICE AND RESPONSIILITY (1990) (tracing the history of the reforms from the 1950s
through the 1980s). Some of these rules were incorporated into the Labor Law and, as
in other areas of Chinese legal reform, its drafters had the benefit of lessons obtained
during the earlier, experimental phase before fundamental national-level legislation
was adopted.
66. LCL, supra note 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie
Zhongcai Fa (
) [Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong.,
Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Labor Arbitration Law]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye
Cujin Fa (
) [Employment Promotion Law (P.R.C.)]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective
Jan. 1, 2008) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.)
67. China’s social insurance system was instituted as part of the transition to
market-based labor relations under the Labor Law. See Labor Law, supra note 4, ch. 9.
The regulation and administration of social insurance benefits is now governed by the
2010 Social Insurance Law. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa (
) [Social Insurance Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective July 1, 2011) STANDING COMM.
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.). Social insurance is partially funded by mandatory
employer and employee contributions to five basic insurance funds based on
withholding rates set at the local level: pension, health, disability and occupational
injury, unemployment, and maternity insurance. Labor Law, supra note 4, at ch. IX;
Social Insurance Law, supra chs. VII–VIII.
68. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Labor Law, supra note 4
at § 16 (written contracts); id. §§ 41–44 (limits on overtime); id. §§ 32, 50 (prohibitions
on bonded labor and abusive practices); id. ch. IX (social insurance).
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regulations. The indeterminacy of the Labor Law was
complicated by the proliferation of regulations, judicial
interpretations, and informal implementation practices at the
local level, on top of prior authorities, much of which was
neither transparent nor readily accessible to the firms and
employees it governed.69 In fact, an important contribution of
the LCL, like the Labor Law before it, was its effort to codify
prior administrative regulations and judicial interpretations,
adding clarity and clout to existing law. This pattern is typical of
legislative reform in China, which often begins with local
experimentation and ad hoc administrative guidance, followed
by a national legislative effort that in many respects codifies
prior regulation, which itself then generates a new baseline for
interpretative guidance to emerge.70
Second, the Labor Law attempted to strike a balance
between employers’ need for flexibility, on the one hand, and
consistent minimum protections for all workers in the economy,
on the other. As Gallagher and Dong have observed, the Labor
Law paved the way for state sector reform and the emergence of
labor markets in the Chinese economy by freeing employers
from the constraints of the command economy and the “iron
rice bowl” of cradle-to-grave employment. While weighted on
the side of employer autonomy, the law also sought to increase
oversight of the burgeoning private sector. Accordingly, it
established a new regulatory model built on contractual
employment relationships.71 It said nothing about dispatched
69. For example, the resolution of labor disputes occupies one chapter of the
Labor Law, but spawned a vast body of implementing authority, some conflicting.
Labor Law, supra note 4, ch. X. For a survey of the related regulations, see VIRGINIA
HARPER HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR RIGHTS
& LEGAL REFORM 36–47, 55–81 (2004).
70 . This pattern is widely recognized. See, e.g., ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 141 (4th
ed. 2011) (acknowledging the role of local regulations as a precursor to national
reform); Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, Processes,
Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 384 (2008) (citing examples from the LCL’s
provisions on severance pay and its codification of a 2006 judicial interpretation
permitting direct litigation of certain unpaid wage claims).
71. On the goals and legislative history of the Labor Law and the LCL, see
generally Mary E. Gallagher & Dong Baohua, Legislating Harmony: Labour Law Reform in
Contemporary China, in FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS,
WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN CHANGING CHINA 36 (Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee &
Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011).
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workers and little about other nonstandard employment
relationships. 72 The ACFTU and other labor advocates later
challenged the Labor Law’s approach as offering inadequate
protection for employees, leading to calls for new legislation.73
The inherent contradictions between the twin goals of the
reform inevitably led to tensions and deficiencies in
implementation, and ultimately triggered the next phase of the
recursive reform process.
Although the “diagnostic struggles” that preceded the
Labor Law’s passage are not fully transparent, strong ideological
differences clearly shaped the final form of the legislation.74 In
addition, “actor mismatch” between state-sector firms, the
ACFTU, and officials involved in the drafting process, on the
one hand, and the local officials and firms charged with its
implementation, on the other, have contributed to the
resistance, evasion, and outright conflict that hampered the
success of the Labor Law as a vehicle for worker rights.75
The drafting process of the LCL brought the diagnostic
struggles of the late 1990s and early 2000s to the fore. Internal
debate among the drafters centered on the extent to which the
new law should favor employees or maintain a more neutral
stance.76 Two drafts of the legislation were released for public
comment, attracting intense public debate and a record number
of recommendations from foreign and domestic business
organizations, trade union representatives, and labor advocacy
groups. 77 While the final version responded to some of the
concerns of the business community, other provisions that had
faced strong opposition were retained. Most obvious among
these were limits on terminations, new rules on indefinite (i.e.
non-fixed term) contracts, and expanded severance
72. The Labor Law does contain provisions on probationary periods; it also
encourages self-employment and the state’s establishment of labor services agencies to
aid job-seekers. See Labor Law, supra note 4, arts. 10, 11, 21 (self-employment,
employment services, and probation).
73. On the competing interests represented in the LCL drafting process, see
generally Gallagher & Dong, supra note 71.
74. See generally id.
75. See, e.g., CHING KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA’S
RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT 20, 176–82 (2007).
76. See JOSEPHS, supra note 65, at 381–83 (citations omitted) (outlining the poles
of the debate).
77. See generally Gallagher & Dong, supra note 71.
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requirements.78 The LCL, not surprisingly, bears the imprint of
the competing “diagnoses” and reform visions expressed in the
drafting process, which sowed the seeds for the most recent
round of reforms.
In contrast to the Labor Law, which was designed to give
employers new flexibility and promote workforce mobility,79 the
LCL was more clearly weighted toward employees. 80 It
significantly strengthened formal protections for employees and
reduced much of the indeterminacy created by the Labor Law
and related implementing measures. 81 The LCL emphasized
contracts of unlimited duration by providing that failure to
enter into a written contract would give rise as a matter of law to
a contract for an unlimited term, entitling the employee to
generous severance and added protections from termination.82
It also increased severance obligations, and provided that
employees hired under two successive fixed-term contracts must
be hired for an indefinite term.83
The LCL also adopted a combined carrot-and-stick
approach to incentivize employer compliance that has improved
formal compliance with some of its basic mandates. 84 It
toughened penalties for common violations, for example, by
adding teeth to the existing rule requiring written labor
contracts.85 Its implementation mobilized workers to enforce the
LCL, opening the door to stronger grassroots support for the

78. See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 68–71 (discussing these provisions); Sean
Cooney et al., China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity of
Labour Relations in the PRC, 30 UNSW L. J. 788, 793-802 (2007) (same).
79. These features were seen as essential to promoting effective state sector
reform. See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 69 (discussing the goals of the Labor Law).
80. See generally Gallagher & Dong, supra note 71 (analyzing the drafting process
and interest groups behind the LCL).
81. For a survey of the key changes, see generally Cooney et al., supra note 78.
82. LCL, supra note 1, art. 20.
83. Id. arts. 14(3), 46–47.
84 . See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 89–100 (discussing early impacts on
implementation of the labor contract requirement). For more recent evidence, see
generally Gallagher et al., supra note 30.
85. LCL, supra note 1, arts. 14, 82. The LCL provides that if an employer failed to
sign a written employment contract with an employee within one year, the employee is
entitled to punitive damages of twice the employee’s salary; thereafter, any employee
without a written contract is deemed to have obtained an indefinite-term contract. Id.
See also Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 73, 76–78 (discussing these provisions).
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new rules, which further weakened actor mismatch between the
legislative process and the implementation phase.
As a result of these changes, China’s labor law is formally
now stricter than in many developing countries.86 At the time,
the LCL was rightly hailed by labor advocates as a major step
forward for China’s workers. Employers decried the LCL as too
much, too fast.87 Many of the new measures inevitably raised
labor costs, either by foreclosing avenues for cost-cutting noncompliance or by imposing new affirmative obligations.88
The broader context of the LCL’s passage—that is, factors
exogenous to the lawmaking and implementation cycle—made
its real and perceived burden on employers who were already
under pressure even heavier. The ACFTU and its local branches
had been working before 2008 to meet targets for organizing
domestic and foreign-invested employers and initiating
collective contract and wage negotiations.89 Urban areas were
already steadily raising the statutory minimum wage in response
to persistent labor shortages and heightened worker
expectations.90 Pressure on employers mounted further in May

86. Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 2 and sources cited therein.
87. See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 89–93 (surveying early responses to the
legislation).
88. Gallagher et al. have presented the first evidence of the widely anticipated cost
impact on employers. See Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 21–23.
89 . See Harper Ho, From Contracts to Compliance, supra note 62, at 86–87
(discussing these efforts). After a hiatus in 2008 and 2009 during the financial crisis,
these efforts resumed. See Feng & Cai, supra note 44, at 7 (reporting on the ACFTU’s
2010 campaigns).
90. Shifting migration patterns are a primary cause of these labor shortages, as
migrant workers increasingly seek opportunities inland. See Chong Qing & Jin Tang,
Changing Migration Patterns: Welcome Home, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2012, at 53–55; Jialu
Liu et al., Chinese Workers: Under Threat or a Threat to American Workers? (Ind. Univ.
Research Cntr. for Chinese Politics and Business Working Paper No. 2 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673207. Migrant worker ambitions and expectations, as
well as rights consciousness, are also rising and increase upward pressure on wages and
labor standards. See, e.g., Ouyang Juan, Xin Shengdai Nongmingong de Jiazhiguan Yanjiu (
) [Research on the Worldview of the New Generation of
Migrant Workers], 6 FAZHI YU SHEHUI [LAW & SOC’Y] 190 (2012); Zhang Min,
Xinshengdai Nongmingong Zhong de Butong Renqun: Dui Liyi Suqiu he Qunti Shijian de
Taidu Fenxi (
) [A
Different Group of New Generation Migrant Workers: Analysis of Attitudes toward Their
Expectations and Collective Incidents], 2 ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN YANJIU [CHINA YOUTH
RES.] 65 (2013). In China, the minimum wage is set at the provincial, rather than the
national, level. On current trends, see Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 16 (reporting
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2008, shortly after the LCL took effect, when a new nationallevel law on labor dispute mediation and arbitration lowered
procedural and financial barriers, expanding employees’ ability
to pursue legal claims for violations of employment laws.91 The
combined effect of the LCL and greater access to labor
arbitration and the courts was an immediate exponential
upsurge in labor disputes—in some jurisdictions, caseloads
soared by as much as three hundred percent.92
The timing could hardly have been worse for companies. By
unhappy coincidence, the onset of the financial crisis
compounded the effect of these dramatic changes, creating a
“perfect storm” for local and foreign employers in China. Many
companies went out of business, and trade and industry groups
petitioned the central government to suspend enforcement of
the LCL, although ultimately no formal action was taken to
lessen its bite.93 Not surprisingly, employers began to look for
loopholes in the LCL, and they found them in the rules
governing labor dispatch.
C. Nonstandard Workers Under the Labor Contract Law
As early as 2007, many observers predicted that the legal
restrictions and costs associated with the new rules, and
particularly those surrounding termination and severance,
would incentivize employers to expand part-time and labor
dispatch hiring. 94 According to one survey of 417 employers in
the Pearl River Delta conducted in 2007 and early 2008, about
thirty percent of the respondents reported plans to rely more
heavily on labor dispatch after the LCL took effect.95 These early
that six provinces and a number of major cities have seen double-digit wage increases
in recent years).
91. Labor Arbitration Law, supra note 66. On the Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration Law, see Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 67, 74–82.
92. See id. at 95–98 (discussing these trends). This surge declined to more modest
levels after 2009. LAODONG TONGJI NIANJIAN 2012 [Labor Yearbook 2011] (2012), at
368, tbl. 9-1.
93. Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 87–89 and sources cited therein.
94. See, e.g., Cooney et al., supra note 78, at 798, 800 (“One of the strongest
impacts of the [LCL] is likely to be felt in the use of labour hire or ‘dispatch’ . . .
workers.”).
95. This survey was conducted by Job88.com, a human resource consulting
service. Job88 Xin Laodong Hetong Fa Qiye Yingdui Qingkuang Diaocha Baogao
(Job88
) [Job88 Survey Report on Enterprise
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estimates turned out to be extremely conservative—the
estimated number of dispatched workers is now more than
double the levels before the LCL took effect in 2008. 96 In
Dongguan, a manufacturing center outside Guangzhou in south
China, the number of temp agencies jumped over five hundred
percent after 2008, not including unregistered firms. 97
According to the drafters of the amendments, strong concerns
among employers about the risks presented by the LCL’s rules
on long-term contracts, high demand for cost-effective
alternatives, ambiguities in the LCL, and low barriers to entry in
the nascent labor services industry have all contributed to the
rapid expansion of labor dispatch.98
There is a certain irony in the fact that the LCL, which was
designed to advance worker rights—and which appears in fact to
have motivated greater adherence to formal protections for
many employees 99 —has also directly facilitated both creative
compliance and outright abuse of labor dispatch.100 In contrast
to the Labor Law, the LCL contains an entire section governing
the use of dispatched workers,101 as well as specific provisions on
other forms of non-standard labor—probationary and part-time
Responses to the New Labor Contract Law], http://image3.job88.com/08/
dcb20080114/index.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
96. Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 15.
97. A survey in 2010 conducted by the Dongguan labor bureau identified 512
labor service agencies, up from 100 in 2008. 151 Laowu Paiqian Jigou Jin Hei Mingdan
(151
)[151 Labor Dispatch Agencies Blacklisted], DONGGUAN
YANGGUANG WANG [DONGGUAN SUN NEWS], Nov. 24, 2010.
98 . See, e.g., Preamble, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa
Xiuzhengan (Caoan) [Draft Amendments to the Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.)], 11TH
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. (P.R.C.), 27th Session, released for public
comment July 6, 2012, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/201207/06/content_1729107.htm [hereinafter LCL Draft Amendment]. 6000wan Ren
)[60
Laowu Paiqian Renyuan Quanyi Nan Baozhang (6000
Million Temp Workers’ Rights are Hard to Protect], JINGJI RIBAO [ECON. DAILY], Feb. 28,
2011 [hereinafter 60 Million Temp Workers’ Rights ] (reporting that labor dispatch has
become “abnormally prosperous”).
99. See generally Gallagher et al., supra note 30.
100. This connection is widely recognized. See, e.g., Mei Lai & Yang Xin, Lun
Laowu Paiqianzhong Laodongzhe Quanyi Baohu – Guanyu “Laodong Hetong Fa Diaoyan
Wenjuan” de Shizheng Fenxi, 2 GUOJIA XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [NAT’L SCHOOL OF
ADMIN. J.], Feb. 2011, 52–56 (tracing reactions to the LCL and assessing the LCL’s
effect on dispatched workers).
101. LCL, supra note 1, ch. 5(2), arts. 57–67. The Labor Law references only
“employees” and “employing units.”
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work. 102 In many respects, it also anticipates and forecloses
obvious potential abuses. By creating an alternative framework
for hiring nonstandard workers, the LCL also responded to
strong concerns raised by the business community during the
drafting process about the rigidity and costs they anticipated
from its tougher rules on hiring and dismissal.103
All of these factors should have short-circuited the recursive
loop. However, the LCL’s affirmation of labor dispatch and
other forms of nonstandard work as an alternative to standard
employment relationships, coupled with the indeterminacy of
the new rules and a tougher enforcement environment, led to
an over-expansion of labor dispatch and set the stage for the
2013 amendments. In this respect, China’s experience is
consistent with that of other jurisdictions that have seen an
upsurge in outsourcing, hiring through intermediaries, and
other forms of informal work when more protective legislation
for standard hires is introduced. This Section introduces the key
provisions of the LCL that addresses all forms of nonstandard
work, with an emphasis on labor dispatch as a foundation for
Part D’s survey of employer responses to the LCL.
1. Probationary & Part-Time Work
Part-time and probationary work are among the forms of
nonstandard employment that are afforded new protections
under the LCL yet offer employers added flexibility. “Part-time
labor use” (feiquanrizhi yonggong
) is defined as
work that is generally compensated on an hourly basis and that
does not exceed an average of 24 hours per week or 4 hours per
day for the same employer.104 Part-time workers must be paid at
least the local minimum wage and cannot be subject to a
probationary term.105 However, they need not be hired under

102. Id. arts. 19–21, 68–72 (probationary and part-time workers, respectively).
103. See Cooney et al., supra note 78, at 796–800 (outlining the debate over
indefinite-term contracting and termination rights for standard and nonstandard
workers under the LCL).
104 . LCL, supra note 78, art. 68. These rules replace earlier MOLSS
interpretations that had offered expanded rights and defined part-time work as no
more than 30 hours per week and 5 hours per day. RONALD C. BROWN,
UNDERSTANDING LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA 30 (2008).
105. Id. art. 70 (prohibiting probation); id. art. 72 (minimum wage).
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written contract and can be dismissed at will without
severance.106
As under the Labor Law, employees may be hired on a
probationary basis for up to six months.107 The LCL added new
requirements that probationary employees cannot be
terminated without cause. 108 They must be paid at least
minimum wage and no less than eighty percent percent of the
non-probationary rate.109 The possibility of a trial period lowers
employers’ risk and cost even if the employee is ultimately
retained. However, the time constraints on both part-time work
and the use of probationary periods make them less useful to
employers seeking to meet long-term, or even seasonal, hiring
needs.
2. Labor Dispatch & the Regulation of Employment Agencies
Labor dispatch offers employers an opportunity to achieve
greater flexibility and lower costs on a longer-term basis. Like
workers hired through intermediaries in the United States,
dispatched workers are formally employed by a labor services
agency, which recruits workers and places them with requesting
firms.110 The terms of this trilateral arrangement are governed
by (i) a labor dispatch contract between the temp agency and
the company using the dispatched workers111 and (ii) a labor
contract between the worker and the temp agency, which is
considered the dispatched worker’s direct employer.112 Under
the LCL, both the temp agency and the company using the
employee’s services have clear obligations toward the worker. In
contrast to jurisdictions that place primary responsibility on
either the temp agency or the labor-using firm, the LCL makes
106. Id. art. 69 (permitting oral contracts); id. art. 71 (requiring notice but no
severance).
107. Article 19 of the LCL also permits a shorter probationary period for shortterm contracts, but in all cases, no more than six months. LCL, supra note 1, art. 19. Cf.
Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 21 (authorizing probationary terms up to six months).
108. LCL, supra note 1, arts. 21, 32(1) (prohibiting termination without cause but
allowing probationary employees to resign at will).
109. Id. art. 20.
110. Id. art. 58.
111. Under Article 59 of the LCL, the labor dispatch contract between the temp
agency and the hiring firm must specify, among other things, the compensation and
insurance payments to which employees are entitled.
112. Id. art. 58.
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the temp agency and the hiring firm jointly and severally liable
for violations that harm dispatched workers.113
The temp agency is considered the formal employer and is
therefore directly responsible for payment of wages and
benefits; these funds are typically received from the labor-using
entity under the terms of its contract with the temp agency,
although the sourcing contract may stipulate which entity will
actually disburse funds and provide specific benefits to
dispatched workers. 114 The LCL explicitly prohibits temp
agencies from assessing fees of any kind from dispatched
workers or retaining any portion of their wages.115 Consistent
with the 1995 Labor Law,116 dispatched employees also have an
explicit right to “equal pay for equal work” (tonggong tongchou
), which is determined based on the compensation paid
to standard employees of a comparable position in the laborusing firm.117
Although they may be assigned to a user firm on a
temporary basis, dispatched workers must still be hired by the
temp agency under a fixed-term labor contract for a minimum
two-year term; they cannot be hired on a part-time basis.118 The
temp agency is also responsible for paying dispatched workers at
least the minimum wage during periods when they are not hired
out, reducing the risk of downtime to the worker.119 They are
also entitled to information about the “relevant content” of the
113. LCL, supra note 1, art. 92. This principle parallels the joint liability doctrine
in the United States under which both the direct employer, such as the temp agency,
and the unit for whom the employee works might share legal responsibility for
purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act if both are engaged in employment-related
activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2012); see also Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note
12, at 259 (discussing relevant authorities).
114. LCL, supra note 1, art. 58.
115. Id. art. 60.
116. Id. art. 63. If the company does not have an employee in a comparable
position, employees in the same locality can serve as the standard. Id.
117. Id. art. 63; cf. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 46 (stating that wage payments
shall follow the principle of equal pay for equal work). If the company does not have an
employee in a comparable position, employees in the same locality can serve as the
standard. LCL, supra note 1, art. 63.
118. Id.; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Shishi Tiaoli (
[Regulation on the Implementation of the Employment Contract Law
(P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the State Council (P.R.C.), No. 535, Sept. 18, 2008, effective
Sept. 18, 2008) [hereinafter LCL Implementing Regulations], art. 30 (prohibiting
temp agency part-time hires).
119. LCL, supra note 1, art. 58.
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labor services contract between the temp agency and its client
firm and have the right to join the union of either the temp
agency or the labor-using entity.120 The labor-using entity, for its
part, must provide working conditions that conform to national
labor standards, inform temporary employees about their job
requirements and compensation terms, pay overtime wages,
bonuses, and benefits related to the position, and provide any
necessary training.121 In addition, the LCL explicitly prohibits
labor-using entities from using multiple short-term labor
dispatch placement contracts to cover a continuous term of
labor use, 122 from subcontracting or redispatching temp
employees sourced elsewhere, and from setting up an internal
temp agency. 123 However, other provisions appear to
contemplate long-term labor dispatch use, since they require
that normal wage adjustment be applied “in cases of continuous
labor dispatch.”124
3. Independent Contractors
Hiring independent contractors is a third alternative to
standard hiring that may reduce compliance risks and costs to
the contracting firm. However, because the Labor Law and the
LCL are directed at the parties to a labor relationship,125 they do
not apply to independent contractors. Similarly, in the United
States, many companies that come under fire for evading tax
obligations and employment laws attempt to classify individual
employees as independent contractors.126 In China, however, an
individual employee cannot legally be a sole proprietor or
independent contractor in their personal capacity without

120. Id. art. 60 (access to labor services contract content); id. art. 64 (right to join
unions).
121. Id. art. 62.
122. Id. art. 59.
123 . Id. arts. 62, 67 (banning redispatch and in-house or “captive” temp
agencies).
124. Id. art. 62.
125. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 2; LCL, supra note 1, art. 2.
126. In 2013, for example, the US Department of Labor began an effort to
crackdown on employers whom they believed were improperly classifying workers as
independent contractors in order to avoid paying overtime and payroll taxes. Jennifer
Smith, Labor Crackdown Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2013, at B6.
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registering as a legal entity.127 Nonetheless, outsourcing offers
employers a ready alternative to labor dispatch that also involves
hiring employees of a third party to perform services at the user
firm. The blurred line between these two approaches has only
recently been addressed in the implementing rules for the
amended LCL, as discussed in Part III below.
***
As this brief summary shows, the LCL attempts to place
dispatched workers on equal footing with standard employees
with regard to the primary terms and conditions of employment.
It also attempts to set clear rules to give employers the flexibility
to hire dispatched workers. Nonetheless, the LCL’s
implementation has revealed challenges that have motivated the
next stage of the labor reform cycle.
D. Measures & Countermeasures: Understanding Recursive Cycles
The core puzzle of post-2008 labor reform is why the LCL’s
efforts to promote compliance with long-standing legal rules
have led so soon to the next phase of a recursive reform cycle
that largely reemphasizes existing rules. An obvious response, of
course, is that the LCL’s provisions on labor dispatch were new
and untested in 2008, making later revisions in the light of
experience almost inevitable.128 In addition, two key drivers of
recursive cycles—ideological and structural contradictions and
indeterminacy or ambiguities in the legislation itself—are
readily apparent in the LCL rules that are the focus of the new
amendments. The incentives created by the earlier legislation
and the degree of regulatory distance it reflects are two further
potential drivers of the reform process discussed below. While
they are not part of Halliday and Carruthers’ initial framework,
they usefully explain post-2008 responses to the LCL’s labor
dispatch rules.
127. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (
(2005
)) [Company Law (2005 Revision) (P.R.C.)] (as amended by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter PRC Company
Law], STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. arts. 58–64 (P.R.C.).
128. In Halliday and Carruthers’ terms, new legal rules often have unintended
consequences that may create indeterminacy and undermine the goals of the initial
reform, driving a new recursive cycle. See HALLIDAY & CARRUTHERS, supra note 8, at
1149.
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First, the LCL’s core ambivalence over whether to limit or
encourage labor dispatch reflects the ideological and structural
contradictions that polarized the LCL drafting process and
ultimately resulted in few real limits on labor dispatch or labor
services agencies. 129 For example, Article 66 gives employers
wide berth to expand their use of dispatched workers. It states
that that “labor dispatch shall generally apply to temporary,
auxiliary, or substitute positions.” 130 The use of the term
“generally” implies that employers may use seconded workers
beyond the “three conditions” listed in Article 66 and still be in
compliance with the LCL. Moreover, neither “temporary,”
“auxiliary,” or “substitute” are defined in the text. As a result,
many employers have expanded their use of dispatched workers
since 2008 in positions that were designed for (and in many
cases also held by) direct hires or have even made temp hiring
the base of their workforce.131
The ambiguity of the LCL’s “equal pay for equal work”
requirement has also driven employers’ over-reliance on labor
dispatch. This requirement was already included in the Labor
Law, which, like the LCL, uses the term “compensation” (chou
) rather than “wages” (gongzi
).132 Although regulatory
guidance from the Ministry of Finance requires employers to
document many common fringe benefits, such as any monthly
housing, transportation, or meal allowances, as “wages” (gongzi
),133 neither the LCL nor its 2008 implementing rules clarify
whether “equal pay for equal work” also requires equal benefits
and overtime wages. As of 2013, local rules in some provinces,
including Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin require both pay
and benefit equality to some extent, but this interpretation is by
no means universal.134
129. For evidence of this link, see Cooney et al., supra note 78.
130. LCL, supra note 1, art. 66 (emphasis added).
131. See Laowu Paiqian Lifa de Wudu ji Qi Wanshan (
) [Misinterpretations of the Labor Dispatch Law and a Response], GONGREN RIBAO
[WORKERS’ DAILY], Aug. 24, 2010 [hereinafter Misinterpretations].
132. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 46.
133. Caizhengbu Guanyu Qiye Jiaqiang Zhigong Fulifei Caiwu Guanli de Tongzhi (
) [Notice Regarding Strengthening the
Financial Management of Employee Benefits] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin.,
No. 242, 2009) art. 2 [hereinafter Finance Regulations].
134. Local rules in several provinces clarify that dispatched workers are entitled to
receive equal pay and benefits, and, in some cases, mandate the use of equivalent wage
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Many employers have enjoyed significant cost savings
through technical compliance with the equal pay requirement
in terms of base wages, while offering limited or no benefits to
dispatched workers. 135 This has created major disparities
between dispatched and standard workers.136 In addition, until
quite recently, companies could hire dispatched workers from
agencies in cheaper jurisdictions to take advantage of lower
social insurance withholding rates.137
allocation methods. See Tianjinshi Renli Ziyuan he Shehui Baozhangju, Tianjinshi
Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju Tianjinshi Laowu Paiqian Guanfa (
) [Regulations on the Administration of Labor Dispatch of Tianjin Municipality]
(promulgated by the Tianjin Human Res. & Soc. Sec. Bureau & Tianjin Admin. for
Indus. & Commerce, No. 76, Sept. 16, 2011, effective Sept. 20, 2011 to Sept. 20, 2016)
art. 9 [hereinafter Tianjin Labor Dispatch Regulations] (requiring equal wages and
benefits); Chongqingshi Zhigong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli (
)
[Chongqing Regulation on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Employees]
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Tianjin People’s Cong., No. 8, Mar.
25, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) art. 28 [hereinafter Chongqing Regulations]; cf. Liaoning
Sheng Zhigong Laodong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli (
) [Liaoning
Regulations on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Employees] (promulgated
by the Liaoning People’s Cong., June 3, 2013), available at http://npc.people.com.cn/
n/2013/0603/c14576-21719165.html (requiring employers to apply the same wage
allocation method but not mandating equal benefits). This issue has now been
addressed by the Labor Dispatch Provisions, discussed infra, Part II.B.
135 . The amendments’ drafters formally acknowledged the sometimes wide
disparities in benefits and social insurance coverage of temp workers in the Draft
Amendment of the LCL (supplemental explanation). See LCL Draft Amendment supra
note 98, para. 3.
136. Dangqian Woguo Laowu Paiqian Yonggong Xiankuang Diaocha (
) [Investigation of the Situation of Today’s Dispatched Workers], 2012
CHINA LABOR 5, 24 [hereinafter ACFTU Investigation] (reporting findings from local
trade union surveys). Tax regulations limit benefits to no more than fourteen percent
of wages. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suode Shuifa Shishi Tiaoli (
) [Enterprise Income Tax Law Implementing Regulations
(P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the State Council, No. 512, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1,
2008) (P.R.C.), art. 40.
137. Disparities in social insurance withholding rates have been eliminated by the
LCL amendments. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28 (requiring
social insurance to be based on the user firm’s jurisdiction). These gaps had already
diminished by 2013 as local governments implemented the 2011 Social Insurance Law
with local rules targeting this problem. See, e.g., Guangdong Sheng Qiye Zhigong Jiben
Yanglao Baoxian Shengji Tongdeng Shishi Fangan (
) [Guangdong Province Enterprise Workers’ Basic Pension Insurance
Uniform Provincial Implementation Measures] (promulgated by the Guangdong
Provincial People’s Government, No. 15, Feb. 25, 2009, effective Feb. 25, 2009 (P.R.C.)
(requiring withholding rates across Guangdong to converge to a uniform standard as
of 2012); see also Tianjin Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 134, art. 7 (requiring
social insurance payments to be based on the applicable rate for the labor-using firm).
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The expansion of the labor services industry has also
advanced largely in technical compliance with the LCL. Under
its original terms, the only requirements to establish a labor
services agency were a standard business registration and
registered capital of RMB¥500,000 (about US$81,000), both of
which could be easily met.138 No regulatory authorization was
required. 139 Skyrocketing demand for temp hires and the
profitability of the sector combined with a lack of formal
oversight mechanisms to fuel an explosion in the number of
temp agencies.140 In Guangdong, for example, recent estimates
put the number of temp agencies in the province at over 3000,
with over 2 million dispatched workers.141 Since 2008, the need
for heightened regulation of the industry has become readily
apparent and has helped to motivate the recent amendments.
Beyond the factors identified by Halliday and Carruthers,
the literature on regulatory compliance suggests new
dimensions of the recursivity model that go further in
explaining why and when a new cycle of reform might arise.
Bardach and Kagan’s work observes, first, that when the
demands of new legislation are high relative to current business
practice, avoidance, evasion, and outright resistance are more
likely, particularly when regulated firms’ ability or will to comply
is low.142 In other words, the degree of regulatory distance the
138. LCL, supra note 1, art. 57. At the time, the general registered capital
requirement for a limited liability company under the PRC Company Law was
RMB¥30,000 (US$4,900). PRC Company Law, supra note 127, art. 26.
139 . Prior to 2010, local regulations in Shandong Province did impose an
additional permitting requirement. Guanyu Guifan Laowu Paiqian Qiye Dengji Guanli
Youguan Wentide Tongzhi (
) [Notice
Regarding Problems in the Scope of Labor Dispatch Registration Management]
(promulgated by the Shandong Province Human Resources and Social Security
Bureau, Shandong Province Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 690 (Oct.
18, 2010) (rescinding the rule).
140. See, e.g., Guifan Laowu Paiqian Kaoyan Lifa Zhihui (
) [Regularizing Labor Dispatch Tests Legislative Wisdom] (June 26, 2012), available
at www.worker.cn.cn (linking the rapid growth of labor dispatch to the passage of the
LCL).
141. Yonggong Danwei Laowu Paiqiangong Zhongshu Bu De Chaoguo 3 Cheng (
) [Temp Hires Cannot Exceed 30 Percent of the Workforce],
DONGGUAN RIBAO [DONGGUAN DAILY], Apr. 18, 2012.
142 . See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 93–119 (1982) (identifying some of the
negative effects of tough regulations and aggressive enforcement). Bardach and Kagan
also note that when tough regulations are directed at only a minority of firms, the rules
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reform represents can directly affect its legitimacy and impact.
Ayres and Braithwaite, among others, also stress that the mix of
positive and negative incentives incorporated in the reform can
directly affect how successfully it will be adopted, and that the
choice between alternative incentives may depend on whether
the target population is compliance-minded or resistant.143 The
implementation of the LCL bears out these observations.144
One area where the regulatory distance between the LCL’s
standards and firm practice has been particularly wide are in the
LCL’s rules governing the choice of contract term. Historically,
most employment contracts in China, particularly in
manufacturing, have been for one- or two-year terms. In order
to foster stable employment relationships, the LCL adopted
controversial provisions that favor contracts for an indefinite
term. Such contracts can be created as a matter of law by the
renewal of two fixed-term contracts of any length.145 They also
give rise to severance benefits based on years of service and can
only be terminated on grounds provided for in the LCL.146
Through labor dispatch, in contrast, an employer can simply
return the worker to the temp agency if their services are no
longer needed without liability for severance.147
At the same time, labor dispatch incentivized employers to
attempt to shift the risks and costs of the LCL’s tough regulatory
obligations to temp agencies. Although the original terms of the
may promote resentment and resistance from compliance-oriented firms. Id. at 92,
112–16.
143 . See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6; Peter J. May, Compliance
Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (2004); Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998).
144. On the early implementation of the LCL, see Harper Ho, supra note 62, at
83–98.
145. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
146. Employers widely perceive such contracts as difficult and expensive to
terminate. See Laowugong Lanyong Zhi Jiti Zhengyi Anjian Daliang Zengjia (
) [Disputes Arising from the Abuse of Labor Dispatch Soar], FAZHI
RIBAO (
) [LEGAL DAILY] (Feb. 27, 2012).
147 . Under the LCL, only the legal employer is responsible for severance
payments and consideration for any noncompete obligations imposed, although a
labor services agreement could contractually impose costs on a user firm that returns a
dispatched worker. LCL, supra note 1, art. 47. The 2014 implementing rules now
require temp agencies to provide severance to dispatched workers in accordance with
the LCL. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, arts. 14–17.
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LCL impose clear obligations on the labor-using firm, China’s
labor and employment laws, like those in the United States, are
based on employment status. As a result, temp agencies bear
greater legal responsibility for dispatched workers than the
labor-using firm as a practical reality, and many employers saw
labor dispatch as a way to push workplace injury compensation
costs or other legal obligations to the temp agency as the
primary employer; some of these would ultimately, if not legally,
be passed on to the employee.148 This reality, coupled with the
fly-by-night nature of many temp agencies, which were largely
unregulated, shielded labor-using firms but often left workers
unable to pursue legal claims in the event a violation occurred.
The unintended effects of other regulatory mandates can
also expand regulatory distance and, in the employment
context, can drive firms to rely more heavily on labor dispatch
and other forms of nonstandard employment. For example, in
the United States, many employment mandates, including the
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
only apply to firms who have more than a specified threshold
number of employees or employees who work for a specified
period of time; because only direct employees are counted,
outsourcing and part-time hiring can help some employers
remain exempt from these requirements.149 Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many US employers may be relying more heavily
on temp hires and part-time employees to avoid the added
health insurance costs required by the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act for firms employing more than fifty
people who work more than thirty hours per week.150 Similarly,
148. See Misinterpretations, supra note 131 (arguing that temp hiring under the
LCL does not create cost savings). Although contractual risk shifting from the statutory
employer to the user firm has been authorized by certain local regulations, as in
Shanghai, contractual provisions cannot contravene statutory mandates. See, e.g.,
Shanghaishi Laodong Hetong Tiaoli (
) [Shanghai Labor Contract
Regulations] (promulgated by the Shanghai Mun. People’s Cong., Nov. 15, 2001,
effective May 1, 2002), arts. 25, 28 (P.R.C.).
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b)(3), 2000e(b) (2012) (“[E]mployer’ means a person . .
. who has fifteen or more employees . . .”). For further discussion of these limits, see
Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 12, at 256–80; Befort, supra note 19, at 164–70.
150. Patrice Hill, “Obamacare” Benefits Mandate Could Further Phase Out Full-Time
Work, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/
jun/16/obamacare-benefits-mandate-could-further-phase-out/?page=all;
Will
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in China, a key reason why China’s major SOEs and other large
firms, who typically are under far less cost pressure to do so,
have been the most dependent on labor dispatch is because it
allows firms to more easily satisfy reporting requirements and
performance targets that are measured with reference to
standard employees.151 This strategy has also allowed these firms
to use the resulting cost savings to expand benefits and salaries
for executives and other standard employees. 152
The prevalence of practices that are explicitly illegal under
the LCL is further evidence of the wide regulatory distance
between the LCL’s standards and existing compliance norms.
These include paying dispatched workers lower base wages than
direct hires doing the same work,153 charging management or
placement fees to dispatched employees, 154 using successive
short-term contracts to mask a long-term employment
relationship as a “temporary” labor dispatch position, 155 and
creating in-house temp agencies to transfer responsibility from
the parent company for workers in fact “dispatched” back to the
parent.156 Not surprisingly, labor dispatch and other forms of
Obamacare Destroy Jobs?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/08/health-reform-and-employment.
151. These include, for example, workplace safety measures and per capita
production targets. See Guowuyuan Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu
Yinfa 2013 Niandu Zhongyang Qiye Yusuan Baobiao de Tongzhi (
2013
) [SASAC Notice Regarding the 2013
Centrally Administered SOEs Budget Reporting Form], No. 156, Sept. 25, 2012.
152. Ma Hanqing, Laowu Paiqian Tiekongzi, Qiye Yue Sheng 20wan, YANGCHENG
WANBAO [GUANGZHOU NIGHTLY REP.], Mar. 7, 2011.
153. See, e.g., Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 16 (reporting that temps at
Nokia’s factory in Dongguan, Guangdong are paid about seventy-five percent of a
direct Nokia employee’s wage and are not permitted to join the union or live in the
employee dormitory).
154. Id. at 15 (reporting typical placement fees paid by workers in 2012 at around
RMB¥200 (US$30)); cf. LCL, supra note 1, art. 60 (prohibiting such fees).
155. All of these practices have been widely reported by Chinese media sources
and labor activists. They are also acknowledged by authorities who promise to crack
down as part of the implementation of the LCL amendments. See, e.g., ACFTU
Investigation, supra note 136, at 24; China Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers,
REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012), www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-laboridUSBRE8BR04120121228 (discussing the common practice of hiring from an internal
“temp agency”). In 2012, the vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress promised increased inspections to catch violators who split longterm contracts into shorter ones to justify a “temporary” position. Id.
156. See generally ACFTU Investigation, supra note 136. See also IHLO Report,
supra note 43; China Labour Bulletin, Amendments to the Labour Contract Law of the
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nonstandard work have led to a rise in labor conflict, both in the
courts and on the streets.157
In sum, the LCL’s tougher standards, coupled with
heightened enforcement efforts by labor authorities post-2008,
represented a high degree of regulatory distance from prior
firm practice. Because the excessive reliance on labor dispatch
observed today is not clearly prohibited by the LCL, employers
were quick to take advantage of its benefits. From one
perspective then, the rapid expansion of labor dispatch offers
some evidence that the law works, motivating employers to take
advantage of legal cost-cutting opportunities. At the same time,
the LCL over-incentivized other firms to illegally expand their
reliance on dispatched workers.
The overuse of dispatched workers to fill what are
essentially regular employee positions, whether legally or
illegally, has undermined the stated goals of the LCL in a
number of ways. First, the dual responsibility of temp agencies
and labor-using firms should have given dispatched workers
added protections, but has in fact produced a reality where
neither assumes responsibility.158 Even though the LCL clearly
identifies the temp agency as the legal employer and creates
clear legal obligations for both the labor-using firm and the
temp agency, the triangular nature of the relationship and the
potential for contractual risk-shifting can create ambiguity about
where responsibility for the employee lies. For example, temp
agencies may fail to remit social insurance premiums, but the
funds are ultimately the legal obligation of the labor-using
employer, which should be specified in its contract with the

People’s Republic of China (Draft): Comments and Recommendations, par. 13 (Aug.
22,
2012),
available
at
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/sites/default/files/File/
labour%20contract%20law%20ammedments.pdf.
157. See Diaoyan Laowu Paiqian Zhidu [An Investigation of the Dispatch Labor System],
ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN [CHINA NEWS WEEKLY], June 30, 2011 (reporting on
findings of the Shanghai Huangpu district court and on threatened suicides of labor
dispatch workers in Guangzhou); Laowu Gong Lanyong Zhi Jiti Zhengyi Anjian Daliang
Zengjia [Collective Disputes Challenging the Abuse of Labor Dispatch Workers
Increases Significantly], LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 27, 2012.
158. The most widely cited media source on the extent of labor dispatch observes
that because “the recruiter doesn’t use the worker and the hiring firm doesn’t
recruit . . . dispatch workers find themselves in a situation where neither one monitors
(liangbuguan
).” See Jiang, Authoritative Report, supra note 34.
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temp agency.159 Employees are often unfamiliar with these rules.
Second, as a result of high turnover, short-term contracting, and
labor dispatch, employees are rarely able to accumulate the
years of service upon which severance depends. 160 These
common practices have undermined the LCL’s stated goal—
promoting stability by encouraging indefinite- and long-term
contracts.
The LCL’s promise of equality for labor dispatch workers
has not been fully realized, in part because labor law reform has
created a dynamic cycle of action and reaction. Supporters of
the new amendments hope they will promote the original goals
of the LCL—encouraging stable, longer term employment
relationships, while offering flexibility to employers. Part II
surveys the improvements made in the 2013 amendments and
their implementing rules and considers their potential to
restore a more balanced role for dispatched labor in the
Chinese economy.
II. THE AMENDED LABOR CONTRACT LAW: REFORM
REPRISE
The significance of the LCL amendments is evident from
the drafting process, which attracted over 550,000 online
responses—a new record—during a month-long public
comment period, as well as widespread attention from foreign
and domestic employers in China, academics, and labor
advocacy groups.161 The amendments were spearheaded by the
ACFTU and drew on proposals by the legal inspection
commission of the National People’s Congress’ Standing
159. LCL, supra note 1, art. 58. See Amendments to the Labor Contract Law of the
PRC (Draft): Comments & Recommendations, CHINA LAB. BULL. (raising this
concern).
160. See 60 Million Temp Workers’ Rights, supra note 98 (citing the 2011 ACFTU
report); Jiangxi: Duangonghua Xianxiang Tuisheng “Xingong Huang” [Jiangxi:
Phenomenon of “Short-Term Work” Gives Rise to “New Labor Shortage”], JIANGXI
DAILY, Feb. 8, 2012 (reporting survey results showing that the average worker stays in
the same position about two years and many for far less).
161. Chen Xin & Zhao Yinan, Revised Labor Law Attracts Public Attention, CHINA
DAILY,
Aug.
7,
2012,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-08/07/
content_15649439.htm (noting that the LCL itself set new records for online feedback
when first drafted, attracting nearly 190,000 submissions). These figures do not include
written submissions.
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Committee, investigations conducted by the Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security (“MOHRSS”) and the ACFTU,
and various reports from local union federations into the use of
dispatched labor.162 In addition, a number of provincial-level
governments had passed specific local rules to respond to the
rise in labor dispatch hiring, some of which influenced the
substance of the amendments.163 The implementing rules for
the new amendments also reflect strong controversy; over 30,000
comments were received in the first month, and the comment
draft was substantially revised before release in final form.164
The final product appears to be a compromise that strictly limits
labor dispatch, but stops short of key enforcement innovations
that were present in the initial draft.
Like early labor law reforms in the United States,165 the
amended LCL is intended primarily to promote social stability
162. See IHLO Report, supra note 43 (reporting on the legislative background of
the proposed amendments). The results of these investigations are documented, in
part, in ACFTU Investigation, supra note 128.
163. These jurisdictions include: Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Jilin, Guangdong
(draft), Liaoning, and Yunnan. See Chongqing Regulation, supra note 134; Shanghai
Dept. of Human Resources and Social Security, Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions,
Shanghai Assoc of Enterprises, and Shanghai Administration of Industry and
Commerce, [Guidance on Regulating the Administration of Labor Dispatch in
Shanghai Municipality] (promulgated May 26, 2011); Guanyu Guifan Benshi Laowu
Paiqian Yonggong Guanli de Ruogan Yijian (
) [Several Opinions on Regulating the Administration of Labor Dispatch in Shanghai
Municipality (Trial Implementation)] (promulgated Feb. 26, 2012, effective. Feb.26,
2012–Dec. 31, 2013); Tianjinshi Laowu Paiqian Guanli Banfa (
) [Regulations on the Administration of Labor Dispatch] (promulgated by Tianjin
Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Tianjin Administration of
Industry and Commerce, Sept. 16, 2011, effective Sept. 20, 2011–Sept. 20, 2016);
Jilinsheng Laowu Paiqian Guanli Banfa (
) [Regulations on the
Administration of Labor Dispatch of Jilin Province], No. 98 (promulgated by the Jilin
Provincial Human Resources and Social Security Bureau on Nov. 22, 2011, effective
Jan. 1, 2012); Guangdongsheng Laowu Paiqian Guanli Guiding (Zhengqiu Yijia Gao) (
(
)) [Rules on the Administration of Labor
Dispatch of Guangdong Province (Comment Draft)], Guangdong Provincial People’s
Government, Feb. 1, 2012, available at www.fzb.gd.gov.cn (last visited May 1, 2014);
Liaoning Labor Regulations, supra note 131.
164. Renshibu Laodong Guanxisi Fuze Tongzhi Jiu “Laowu Paiqian Zanxing Guiding”
Youguan Wenti Da Jizhe Wen (
) [MOHRSS Labor Relations Division Representative Answers Reporters’
Questions on the Labor Dispatch Interim Provisions] (Jan. 26, 2014).
165. For example, some commentators note that when Congress adopted the
1935 Wagner Act, which governs collective bargaining, it did so “[not out of] a
conception of social justice, [but rather] tied its observations on inequality to economic
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and further current economic reform goals. According to the
official commentary that accompanied the initial draft
amendments, their specific objectives were:
(i) To bring into strict order the use of labor dispatch
workers [so that] they do not become the primary mode of
employment; (ii) to protect the status of the working class
and guarantee the rights of labor dispatch workers,
including the . . . right to “equal pay for equal work”; (iii)
to strengthen labor dispatch agency management and the
regulatory responsibility of the labor bureau; (iv) to regulate
labor dispatch and necessary delegation, and appropriately
handle problems that have emerged in the implementation
of the [LCL] . . . and to achieve a stable transition.”166

Together with their implementing rules, the amendments
support these goals by tightening some of the broad concepts
contained in the LCL amendments and setting clearer limits on
the permitted scope of labor dispatch use. The implementing
rules also respond to some of the key concerns of the business
community by carving out from the labor dispatch rules an
exemption for international secondment and secondment to
perform services for a family or individual.167 The amendments
took effect on July 1, 2013, and the implementing rules on
March 1, 2014, although affected companies have until March 1,
2016 to come into compliance with the most stringent
requirements.168
A. Labor Dispatch the Exception, Not the Rule
As noted above, the primary goal of the LCL amendments
is to restrict labor dispatch in order to increase stable
employment and ensure that existing protections apply broadly
across the economy. These concerns arise in the United States as
concerns,” such as reducing strikes and industrial unrest. THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE:
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 10–11
(Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2007).
166. See LCL Draft Amendment (supplemental explanations), supra note 98,
para. I (explaining the goals of the amendments).
167. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 36.
168. LCL Amendments, supra note 2 (providing, however, that existing labor
services agencies have until July 1, 2014 to comply with its registration requirements);
Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28 (creating a two-year transition period
for compliance with the new ten percent limit on labor dispatch hires).
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well; employers have often relied on nonstandard workers
precisely because they may lie beyond the bounds of existing
statutory schemes. 169 This is possible under US federal law
because the degree to which dispatched and other nonstandard
workers enjoy the same protections as employees of the user
firm is treated somewhat differently under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”),170 which establishes wage, hour, and
overtime standards, the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(“OSHA”), 171 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), 172 the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 173
and federal anti-discrimination law.174 Most of these statutory
regimes turn on whether an individual is properly considered an
“employee,” and because no single definition or legal test has
emerged, the determination of whether an individual is entitled
to protection under the statutes may vary depending on the
applicable standard.175
Similarly, employers in China have been able to capitalize
on the ambiguities inherent in the LCL’s labor dispatch rules.
Accordingly, one of the most significant changes introduced in
the 2013 amendments is the amendment of Article 66, which
had stated that labor dispatch shall “generally” (yiban
) be
used for “temporary” (linshixing
), “auxiliary” (fuzhuxing
), or “substitute” (daitixing
) positions. A new
clause deletes the word “generally” and emphasizes that
“[direct] contract-based employment is the basic employment
model of the PRC” and that “[l]abor dispatch is supplemental
and shall only be used” for these three types of positions.176
169. MARION G. CRAIG ET AL, WORK LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 67 (2010).
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
171. §§ 651–678.
172. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.) .
173. §§ 151–169 .
174. The primary federal anti-discrimination laws are the Equal Pay Act of 1963,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206 (2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (2012); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
175 . See Befort, supra note 19, at 166–69 (surveying the primary tests for
determining employment status—the control test, the “economic realities” test applied
under the FLSA, and the hybrid common law test that has been applied in Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) cases).
176. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 3 (amending LCL, art. 66) (author’s
translation).

2014]

RECURSIVITY OF REFORM

1013

The revised LCL also narrows the scope of these so-called
“three conditions.” Revised Article 66 specifies that “temporary”
positions are those with a term of no more than six months,
“auxiliary” positions are those that are not the primary business
of the company but that serve positions within the primary
business of the company, and “substitute” positions are those
that replace standard employees while they have taken a leave of
absence for full-time training, vacation, or other reasons. 177
Although the LCL’s implementing rules largely reiterate these
definitions, the rules now follow an earlier approach adopted in
Shanghai that allows the scope of “auxiliary” positions to be
determined by collective consultation on an “equal” basis
(pingdeng xieshang
) with worker representatives or the
178
union.
Interestingly, the amendments leave unchanged potentially
contradictory language in Article 62 of the LCL, which states
that “in the case of continuous labor dispatch, the firm using
dispatched labor shall implement a normal wage adjustment
mechanism.” 179 Some commentators had recommended that
this provision be deleted to clarify that any non-temporary
position must be reserved for a direct hire.180 The lack of any
change to this clause suggests that “auxiliary” or “substitute”
positions are not subject to the new six-month limit and that
employers may legally use seconded workers for ongoing
positions.
The most dramatic step toward reducing the level of labor
dispatch under the amended LCL is the introduction of
177. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 3. This provision is consistent with
Article 4 of the LCL, supra note 1, which requires employer rules concerning the
interest of employees to be adopted only upon collective consultation with employee
representatives. The final implementing rules no longer contain proposed language
that would have limited labor-dispatch to full-time positions.
178. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 3. Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Shi
Guoziwei Xitong Guoyou Qiye Laowu Paiqian Yongong de Zhidao Yijian (
) [Guiding Opinion on Progress
toward Regulating Labor Dispatch Hiring by Municipal SOEs under SASAC
Administration] art. 2, (promulgated by Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission, No. 191, May 30, 2011) (authorizing municipal stateowned enterprises to define the scope of the “three conditions” by collective
negotiation).
179. LCL, supra note 1, art. 62(5).
180. See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, supra note 156.
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aggressive objective limit on labor dispatch, a concept that had
been urged by the ACFTU during the drafting process. Under
the amended LCL, firms must “strictly limit” the use of
dispatched workers and keep hiring levels within a percentage
of the total workforce that has now been set by the
implementing rules.181 Although prior local rules had set limits
nearer a 30 percent threshold, the implementing rules now state
that employers the total number of dispatched workers in any
position cannot exceed ten percent of the workforce.182 Firms
have two years to comply with the new limits, and preexisting
labor contracts and dispatch contracts will remain effective
during this transition.183 Although proposed rules would have
deemed workers in excess of the limits to be standard employees
of the user firm, the final rules depend on administrative
enforcement and simply state that no new dispatch hires can be
made until this limit is met.184 The objective limits do not apply
to foreign representative offices, which are required by law to
hire exclusively through intermediaries, or to foreign
secondment by domestic entities.185
B. Equal Pay for Equal Work
Another major change introduced in the LCL amendments
and related implementing rules promotes pay parity for
dispatched workers. In the United States, pay parity between
181. LCL Amendments, supra note 22, para. 3 .
182. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 4. The prior draft of the
implementing rules had set a limit only for auxiliary positions; the present version is
perhaps, more consistent with the underlying LCL amendments. LCL Amendments,
supra note 2, para. 3. Prior local rules had limited all forms of labor dispatch to no
more than thirty percent of the workforce. For example, Chongqing allowed temp
workers to account for up to fifty percent of the workforce but required notice to the
labor bureau if the percentage exceeded thirty percent. See Chongqing Regulation on
the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Employees, supra note 134, art. 28. In
Guangdong’s draft labor dispatch rules, the maximum was thirty percent, but notice
was required if more than twenty persons or ten percent of the total workforce were
temp workers. See Regulations on the Administration of Labour Dispatch of
Guangdong Province, supra note 164, art. 12. To the extent existing limits do not
conflict with those set nationally, they remain in effect.
183. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28.
184. The latter restriction will be extremely difficult to enforce in practice.
185. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, arts. 25–26 (detailing general
exceptions to the labor dispatch rules and further exemptions to the hiring
limitations).

2014]

RECURSIVITY OF REFORM

1015

nonstandard workers and traditional employees has been
proposed by academics, but is not yet a reality as a matter of
law.186 In China as well, “equal pay for equal work” is a basic
promise of the Labor Law that has proven difficult to enforce.187
Interestingly, the LCL amendments simply repeat the original
requirement in Article 63 of the LCL that dispatched workers
receive “equal pay for equal work” and that the labor-using
firm’s employees in similar positions must serve as the basis of
comparison.188 As amended, Article 63 does add a requirement
that both the labor contract entered into between a temp agency
and a dispatched employee, and the sourcing services
agreement entered into by the temp agency and the user firm,
explicitly state that the promised compensation conforms to the
statutory requirement. 189 In addition, amended Article 63
requires employers to adopt the same compensation allocation
method for temp hires as for direct employees. 190 These
requirements may help ensure that any distinctions will be based
not on status, but on a consistent and therefore more equitable
methodology.
The more significant change appears in the amendments’
implementing rules. Previously, approaches taken by local rules
differed on whether “equal pay” required equal benefits as well.
In addition, the finance rules mentioned earlier distinguish cash
benefit payments, considered within the scope of “wages,” from
social insurance withholding or other non-cash benefits.191 The
implementing rules do not redefine “equal pay for equal work”
or mandate equal benefits. However, they now clearly provide
that the user firm must “provide dispatched workers benefits

186. See, e.g., Nancy Segal et al., Full-Time Rights for Part-Time Workers: Parity in
Wages, Benefits, and Advancement Opportunities, 10 J. INDIV. EMP. RTS 245 (2002-03).
187. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 46.
188. The implementing rules also base employee benefits on the user firm’s
jurisdiction, reducing the risk of a “race to the bottom” across provinces. See Labor
Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 18.
189. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 2.
190. This requirement was absent in the initial draft amendments. See Draft
Amendments, supra note 98.
191. See also Finance Regulations, supra note 133 (requiring employers to account
for bonuses, overtime wages, and other cash awards as wage expenses). There is some
statutory support for this in the language of the LCL itself, which refers to wages and
benefits in separate clauses. LCL, supra note 1, art. 62(2)–62(3).
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related to their position without discriminating against them.192
Given the rules’ omission of a
direct “equal benefits”
requirement and the difficulty of litigating employment-related
discrimination claims generally, employers may still enjoy cost
savings by differentiating between standard employees and
dispatched employees in terms of labor-related benefits and
other incentives. However, the prohibition on discriminatory
treatment makes such practices, if unjustified, a risk for the
employer and may reduce the attractiveness of labor dispatch.
C. Labor Contracts & Employment Stability
Further changes to the LCL shore up existing rules that
require hiring under a written employment contract. However,
many labor dispatch agencies have not complied, and lack of
guidance on the temp agency’s right to terminate dispatched
workers returned by the user firm has also undermined the
LCL’s goals of promoting stable, longer-term employment.
These implementation gaps have prompted a new phase of the
recursive reform loop in the implementing rules of the
amended LCL.
In addition to setting new bounds on labor dispatch hiring,
the implementing rules reiterate that dispatched workers must
be hired under two-year written contracts and limit any
probationary period to one term.193 They also promote clarity
regarding compensation, other primary terms of the dispatch
arrangement, and the allocation of responsibility by stipulating
the minimum content of the labor services agreement with the
user firm
However, the rules seek to reduce arbitrary return of
workers by user firms, clarifying that dispatched workers can
only be returned to the temp agency in limited circumstances as
provided under the LCL and that they are covered by existing
provisions of the LCL that restrict dismissal for occupational
disease or injury or certain other stated conditions.194 Under the
LCL, employee terminations must be for cause, and the
192. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 9.
193 . Id. arts. 5–6. This provision may make dispatched workers who are
reassigned to a new user firm less attractive than first-time dispatched workers.
194. Id. arts. 12–13.

2014]

RECURSIVITY OF REFORM

1017

implementing rules confirm that dispatched workers are
covered by these rules and are also entitled to the same
severance rights as standard workers if terminated.195 The rules
also protect dispatched employees from termination if, upon
return by a user firm, the temp agency can only offer work at a
new user firm under lower terms and conditions. 196
Unfortunately, the final rules omit proposed language that
would have confirmed dispatched workers’ right to indefiniteterm contracts. 197 Nonetheless, these other measures are
important steps to improve the job security originally promised
to dispatched workers under the LCL.198
D. Enforcement & Temp Agency Regulation
Finally, the LCL amendments strengthen implementation
by facilitating litigation by dispatched workers to challenge
illegal practices as well as greater administrative oversight by
local labor bureaus. Until the LCL amendments, no cases, to
our knowledge, brought by labor dispatch employees succeeded
in challenging either their unequal status at the workplace or
the terms of employment. Courts could rely on the fact that
employees had contractually agreed to serve as dispatch
employees, and the LCL’s use of the term “generally” effectively
barred any argument that the labor-using firm had exceeded
statutory limits on labor dispatch. The lack of any formal
registration for the labor services sector meant that regulators
had no easy way to police violators or even to identify firms in
the industry.

195. Id. art. 17
196. Id. art. 15
197. Id. art. 8. As a result, some user firms have targeted long-term dispatched
workers, some of whom had served for decades, for dismissal prior to the effective date
of the new rules. Guangtie Jituan Zhongzhi Laowugong Xuqian Fengbo: Xuduo Ren Yi
Gongzuo Shinian (
[Guangzhou
Railway Group Ends Dispatched Worker Contract Renewal Onslaught: Many Had Already
Worked Ten Years], CCTV, Jan. 8, 2014. This gap does, however, leave space for local
rules to adopt a different interpretation and extend this right to dispatched workers.
198. See, e.g., LCL, supra note 1, art. 58 (requiring a two year labor contract with
the labor dispatch agency and minimum wage when no work is available).
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1. Private Enforcement
Private enforcement by employees via litigation is
complicated in every jurisdiction by the triangular contractual
relationships inherent in hiring via an intermediary, unless
applicable law clarifies the allocation of legal responsibility
between the intermediary and the user firm. In the United
States, for example, the Supreme Court has held that under the
FLSA, the definition of “employer” and “employee” must be
construed broadly, making it more likely that at least one, if not
both, of the firms involved will bear legal liability for violations
affecting temporary workers.199 In some cases, user firms and
intermediaries may be deemed “joint employers” and thus
jointly and severally liable for FLSA violations.200
Article 92 of the LCL already stipulates that both the temp
agency and the labor-using entity are jointly and severally liable
for any harm to “the rights and interests” of temp hires. The
amendments’ implementing rules now limit opportunities for
contractual risk-shifting by the temp agency and user firm by
more clearly delineating the obligations of labor dispatch firms
toward dispatched workers, particularly with regard to
occupational disease or injury.201 They also create the potential
for compensatory damages if firms illegally hire dispatched
workers.202 Unfortunately, as discussed below, the final rules
eliminate proposed mechanisms that would have more directly
incentivized labor using firms to comply with the law and to
monitor temp agency compliance.203
199. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (defining
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee” (emphasis added)); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (holding that the terms “employer” and “employee” must be
construed expansively under the FLSA). Courts define these terms by applying a fourfactor “economic reality” test. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440
(10th Cir. 1998). The factors are “whether the alleged employer (1) has the power to
hire and fire employees, (2) supervises and controls employee work schedules or
conditions of employment, (3) determines the rate and method of payment, and (4)
maintains employment records.” Id. at 1440.
200. See Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 12, at 259 (discussing this common
law gloss on the FLSA).
201. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, arts. 8–10, 20 (discussing temp
agency and user firm obligations).
202. Id. at 22.
203. These provisions are discussed infra, Part III.C.
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2. Regulatory Oversight & Administrative Enforcement
The LCL amendments also toughen standards for
establishing a temp agency and to some extent raise the
penalties for violations. The most important change in temp
agency oversight is the requirement that all temp agencies
obtain an administrative license from the labor bureau and
register as a temp agency with the local office of the
Administration of Industry and Commerce (“AIC”).204 This rule
should enable local labor bureaus to distinguish legal and illegal
temp agencies and exercise closer administrative oversight.
The amended LCL also raises the registered capital
requirements for temp agencies to RMB¥2 million, double what
was proposed in the draft amendments. These rules are
intended to ensure that sufficient funds have been invested to
enable the company to cover the basic obligations associated
with its business.205 All temp agencies must also have a fixed
place of business and implement a labor dispatch management
system.206 The fact that these basic business practices had to be
mandated by law hints none-too-subtly at the cavalier way that
many temp agencies have been operating.
Article 92 now authorizes labor bureau authorities to
confiscate any illegal income generated by an unlicensed temp
agency and, in addition, to impose a fine of between one and
five times any income generated, or up to RMB¥50,000
(US$8155) for those without illegal income. The potential fines
that can be imposed on a temp agency or the firm that uses
dispatched workers have also been raised from RMB¥1000–5000
per employee to between RMB¥5000 and RMB¥10,000.
Ultimately, a temp agency can, in addition to a fine, lose its
labor dispatch license for serious violations.207 Consistent with
China’s Administrative Penalties Law, however, penalties are
204. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 1. The permitting regulations have
already been issued by the MOHRSS. MOHRSS, Guanyu Zuohao Laowu Paiqian
Xingzheng Xuke Gongzuo de Tongzhi (
)
[Notice on the Effective Implementation of Labor Dispatch Administrative Permit
Work], (promulgated. June 21, 2013, effective. July 1, 2013).
205. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, art. 92.
206. Similar rules have been adopted by Mexico in its revised Ley Federal de
Trabajo [hereinafter Federal Labor Law], amended by Diario Oficial de la Federación
[DOF], Nov. 30, 2012 (Mex.),.
207. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, art. 92.
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only imposed if the firm fails to correct the violation when
ordered to do so. Moreover, a temp agency operating illegally
would be able to retain its business license and continue provide
other services besides labor dispatch, such as consulting, within
its approved scope of business. This rule strikes a reasonable
compromise between tougher oversight of temp agencies and
tailoring the penalty in a way that minimizes collateral impact on
the labor services industry.
III. WINDING DOWN RECURSIVE CYCLES: MAKING LABOR
LAW WORK 208
As Part II explains, the LCL amendments to no small extent
retrace familiar territory, closing loopholes that have created a
two-tiered system of regulation—one for standard hires and one
for dispatched workers. They allow employers to rely on labor
service agencies to make more efficient adjustments to
production capacity but reaffirm that basic wage and contract
protections should apply to all workers, regardless of status.
Since it is now at least the third time that some of these basic
requirements have made their way into national legislation, an
obvious question is whether the prospects for a shift in employer
practice are any better. In other words, will the reform “work,”
or will it lead to another attempt down the road?
The theory of recursivity articulated by Halliday and
Carruthers offers a basic framework for understanding what
might constitute a “successful” reform cycle. To be sure, their
work emphasizes the cyclical process itself as the key to norm
formation rather than a particular outcome. However, where, as
here, the basic goals for the reform are fairly constant over time
from the standpoint of the state (and of employees), a successful
reform cycle should narrow regulatory distance by producing
new (subjective, internalized) norms that better conform
external behavior to the “law on the books.” As a result, later
legislative reforms would be focused more on marginal, rather
than fundamental changes, and would no longer need to
introduce new penalties or other incentives for the same
conduct unless the underlying policy goals or substantive rules
208. This heading is inspired in part by Sean Cooney’s 2006 survey of labor law
enforcement challenges. Cooney, supra note 7.
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change. The reform would in essence “wind down,” with fewer,
and more narrowly focused, reform iterations.
Since the implementation phase for the LCL amendments
is only beginning at the time of this writing, our goal here is to
consider the likelihood of the amendments’ success in winding
down the recursive cycle based on an expansion of Halliday and
Carruthers’ model. The factors they identify as part of the
recursive process point to an initial hypothesis: to the extent that
the reforms succeed in reducing (i) indeterminacy, (ii) ideological and
structural contradictions among those charged with making and
implementing the law, (iii) diagnostic difference, and (iv) actor
mismatch, they are likely to “wind down” the recursive cycle by
narrowing its scope, frequency, and length.
However, as discussed above, the literature on regulatory
compliance suggests that two other features are important in
explaining or perhaps predicting the potential length and scope
of recursive cycles: (i) the compliance motivations of those
whose behavior is targeted by the new measures, such as
employees, temp agencies, and user firms; and (ii) regulatory
distance—again, the gap between the law on the books and the
norms of conduct that are evident at the start of a reform cycle
in the target communities. As reforms proceed, changing
compliance motivations will, of course, shift dominant norms
and set a new starting point against which the regulatory
distance of later recursive cycles will be measured. Ayres’ and
Braithwaites’ seminal research on incentive structures and
compliance suggests that a mix of regulatory approaches will
ultimately be more successful than either compliance-oriented
or deterrence-oriented approaches, applied in isolation, in
incentivizing compliance and reducing regulatory distance in
later reform cycles.209
Adding compliance incentives and regulatory distance to
the mix suggests a second hypothesis: recursive cycles will increase
in number, length, and scope, taking longer to wind down, if (x)
regulatory distance at the start of a given reform cycle is large, (y)
compliance motivations are weak, or (z) Halliday and Carruthers’ four
primary mechanisms result in greater regulatory distance as reform
cycles proceed. Where these factors pull in different directions, we
209. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6.
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might expect to see recursive loops expanding and contracting,
lengthening or shortening, over time.
This Part draws on these hypotheses to frame an analysis of
the likely impact of the reforms. We conclude that the LCL
amendments make clear strides toward reducing indeterminacy,
incentivizing compliance, and engaging relevant actors in the
law-making and implementation phase. All of these
improvements should wind down the recursive process;
however, they are unlikely to end the cycle, given remaining
ideological and structural contradictions and the continued
indeterminacy of some of the rules themselves. This Part
concludes by proposing measures that might further reduce
indeterminacy and wind down the recursive cycle if
incorporated into new national and local rules.210
A. Contradictions & Diagnostic Struggles
Each phase of labor reform thus far reflects the resolution
of deep diagnostic struggles and ideological contradictions that
played out during the drafting process. These unresolved
tensions are the most significant factor likely to hamper the
impact of the LCL amendments and drive a new reform cycle.
Terence Halliday and legal sociologist Sida Liu’s empirical work
anticipates this. They suggest that the four core recursivity
drivers or mechanisms may be temporally linked in stages of
legal change: underlying ideological and structural
contradictions produce ambiguities and inconsistencies in the
law, and the resulting indeterminacy leads to conflicting
interpretations and diagnostic struggles among those charged
with implementation or compliance, driving further
indeterminacy later in the recursive process.211

210. One of the authors has previously presented some of these recommendations
in Huang Qiaoyan, Xianyou Faluxia Xihua Laowu Paiqian Yonggong Fangshi de
Guifan Yaoqiu (
) [A Call for More Detailed
Regularization of Labor Dispatch Under Current Law], CHINA LABOR, June 2012, at 29–31.
The fact that the implementing rules have been designated as “provisional” does not
mean that further revisions are imminent. However, local regulations may be revised
and can impose tighter limits or create compliance incentives not present at the
national level.
211. See generally Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 943 (applying the recursivity
framework to the ongoing reform of China’s Criminal Procedure Law).
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Admittedly, the adoption of new rules at the national level
in the Labor Law, the LCL, and the recent amendments can be
expected
to
reduce
ideological
contradictions
by
communicating the policy priority placed on the reforms. The
opportunity for public participation during the comment
process might also be expected to improve the quality of the
reforms and reduce actor mismatch, again, the gap between
lawmakers and those charged with implementation.
Unfortunately, structural contradictions pose greater
problems. Local labor bureaus are already hampered by longstanding institutional and capacity constraints, in some respects
not unlike those faced by their US counterparts.212 The recent
explosion in the sheer number of temp agencies and dispatched
workers has only exacerbated these limits. 213 Many of the
widespread abuses of labor dispatch could be addressed simply
by enforcing the existing mandates in the LCL, so changes in
enforcement practice are essential if the amendments are to
have any impact.
However, tough enforcement of the amendments is likely
to be complicated by the competing views of agencies within the
state bureaucracy on the seriousness of the problem and by the
challenges of transitioning improperly hired dispatched workers
and those hired above the ten percent authorized maximum
into standard positions. 214 Of particular concern is the
opposition of the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (“SASAC”), the administrative
agency that oversees state enterprises, to the draft amendments,
212. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the
Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 82 (2005)
(identifying limits of the United States’ complaint-driven enforcement of wage and
hour and occupational safety and health laws).
213. On enforcement challenges generally, see Cooney, supra note 7, at 789.
Media reports continue to document their persistence. See, e.g., Zhongguo Laodong
Jiancha Zhifa Quanli Xiangdang Weiruo, Yuanyuan Ganbushang Chengguan (
) [China’s Labor Inspection Enforcement Authority is
Particularly Weak and Can’t Match the Public Order Authority], LIAOWANG XINWEN
ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK WEEKLY], Feb. 26, 2011.
214. See IHLO Report, supra note 43 (citing MOHRSS regulations that encourage
state-owned enterprises and other public institutions to establish regularization plans
but reporting that these have not been widely followed). The new implementing rules
require firms to file such a transition plan with the relevant labor bureau. See Labor
Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28.
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which were backed by the ACFTU,215 and the state sector’s heavy
dependence on labor dispatch. The MOHRSS itself was not a
strong supporter of the ACFTU’s positions because the ministry
also oversees its own employment service agencies, such as the
various Foreign Enterprise Service Corporations. The
embeddedness of the labor administration as a market player in
the labor services sector and SASAC’s resistance to the changes
mean that local labor authorities are likely to tread softly in
implementing the new rules. Although the new permitting rules
should enable local labor bureaus to exercise better oversight,
enforcement of the labor dispatch rules will likely continue to
depend largely on employee self-help and individual or
collective litigation.
B. Reducing Indeterminacy
Another key reason why recursivity is to some extent
inevitable with respect to regulations on labor dispatch is the
inherent ambiguity of the dispatched labor model. As one
commentator writing on temporary labor in Canada put it, “the
triangular nature of the relationship . . . creates a structural
tendency toward under-enforcement of existing standards, given
the potential for confusion, conflict, or outright obfuscation
concerning the division of [legal] responsibilities between the
client user and the agency.”216 And of course, laws of general
applicability cannot foreclose every potential area of ambiguity
or anticipate every potential variation in circumstance—nor
would it necessarily be desirable to do so.217 Implementation
therefore requires some degree of deference to the discretion of
firm managers and enforcement authorities.
Examples in the LCL are the terms “equal pay,”
“discrimination” with regard to benefits, and the definition of
“equivalent position” for purposes of the equal pay
215. Opposition from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission (“SASAC”) because of the heavy reliance of SOEs on temp workers
reportedly slowed the drafting process of the LCL amendments. See Growing Demand,
supra note 40, at 16; IHLO Report, supra note 43.
216. Bartkiw, supra note 21, at 173.
217. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 142, at 58-77, 84–89 (discussing variation
among regulated enterprises, the difficulty of calibrating regulations to avoid over- or
under-inclusiveness, and the inevitability of compliance gaps).
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requirement, all of which are still open to broad construction by
the employer. With regard to the latter, it is difficult to envision
how a narrower standard might be drafted that could apply
broadly across the economy. Many employers have responded to
the amended LCL by segregating temp and direct hire positions
in different work units to reduce the number of positions for
which an exact equivalent can be found. The amendments also
fail to respond to abusive practices that exploit part-time and
probationary workers,218 so tougher limits on labor dispatch may
cause employers to stretch the definition of probationary or
part-time work as limits on labor dispatch tighten.
C. Incentives & Regulatory Distance
Although missing from recursivity theory as originally
developed, the experience of Chinese labor law suggests that the
compliance incentives before and after a recursive cycle and the
regulatory distance reflected by the reform will also determine
the length and extent of the next recursive loop. For example, if
current reforms improve compliance incentives and succeed in
shifting norms closer toward the letter and spirit of the new
reforms, later reform cycles may be narrower in scope and more
acceptable to the target population, that is, they may exhibit a
shorter regulatory distance from the reality on the ground. This
virtuous cycle will then be more likely to wind down rather than
extend the cycles of recursive reform.
The relative cost of labor dispatch and standard hiring is
one of the most important determinants of employers’
compliance incentives, and tighter regulatory limits will almost
certainly make labor dispatch more expensive. Most obviously,
the ten percent cap on the proportion of labor dispatch hires
and the prohibition on discriminatory benefits is likely to
increase employer costs, perhaps significantly.219 Even with the
two-year phase-in period, the cap also represents a high degree
of regulatory distance and may be difficult for many employers
to meet. It is also likely that, at least in the short term, the new
218 . See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 92 (discussing illegally extended
probationary terms as a response to the LCL).
219 . Any impact will of course be greatest in those sectors where the
implementing rules cap is set substantially lower than actual pre-amendment temp
hiring levels.
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requirements for temp agencies will push some out of the
market entirely, increasing market concentration and reducing
competition. Notwithstanding the benefits to workers from the
exit of “gray market” temp agencies (and the benefits to
government-affiliated temp agencies of reduced competition),
consolidation could raise the cost of temp hiring.220
Whether these shifts will increase standard employment,
and the ultimate effect on total employment, are, as yet,
unknown. However, a recent study by Gallagher et al. has found
that aggregate employment levels in China since the LCL’s
passage in 2008 have proven quite robust in the face of its tough
new standards and tightened enforcement. 221 Empirical
evidence from a study of similar reforms enacted in South Korea
in 2007 also suggests that restricting labor dispatch may lead to
sustained declines in temp hiring without a long-term adverse
effect on total employment levels across the economy. 222
However, some of the findings of these studies may be explained
both as the result of employers learning to adjust to the new
rules and, more pessimistically, of employers finding new
avenues to evade them.223
Another reason why a dramatic shift in current practice
(which might narrow the regulatory distance of future reforms)
may, however, not emerge has to do with what is not included in
the amendments. For example, the final implementing rules do
not include proposed language that would have required
employers to count dispatched workers as employees for
regulatory purposes.
Although this was perhaps deemed
unnecessary in light of the ten percent cap on labor dispatch,
the omission gives some firms continued incentive to use labor
dispatch to improve firm performance measures. Second,

220. Industry consolidation has been predicted by a number of commentators.
See, e.g., Andy Yeo, Duncan A.W. Abate, Hong Tran, & Helen Liao, Proposed Amendments
to the PRC Employment Contract Law (Mayer-Brown Client Alert, Nov. 20, 2012).
221. See Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 23.
222. See generally, Yoo & Kang, supra note 16, at 592. This study found that trends
in temp and standard hiring followed U-shaped curves; an initial decline in temp hiring
persisted two years after the reforms began, and that an initial parallel increase in
standard hires and overall employment in the first few years was not sustained, but did
not decline either. Id.
223. Id. at 579–80, 598–02.
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tougher objective standards initially proposed by the ACFTU224
would have moved beyond the aggregate cap on labor dispatch
and entirely banned the use of dispatched workers in certain
sectors, such as coal mining, that are inherently hazardous.
Similar measures in the European Union allow member states to
adopt bans on the use of short-term or dispatched workers in
positions that pose a danger to safety or health.225 This type of
restriction would reduce ambiguity and would not be likely to
increase regulatory distance; in fact, the rule would better
conform to measures that have already been adopted by some
provincial governments.226 Industries that require professional
qualifications or permits from a professional organization or
agency, such as law, medicine, journalism, and accounting, also
should not be allowed to use dispatched workers. 227 Ethical
concerns about client confidentiality, the challenge of
confirming professional licensure for dispatched employees, the
negative impact of short-term positions and high turnover on
service quality, and the fact that temp agencies are simply not
qualified to bear the responsibility, as the legal employer, for
such professionals, all support clear bans on temp hires in these
sectors. Future regulations should consider such limits for
certain industries.
The implementing rules’ drafters realized that the impact
of the amendments is likely to be moderated by the availability
of outsourcing as an alternative model if employers simply
contract out work previously performed by dispatched workers.
Outsourcing is attractive because it allows employers to enjoy
224. There is some evidence to suggest that political compromise between the
ACFTU, their primary backer, and strong interests in the state sector and even in the
labor administration might have prevented some of these more comprehensive reforms
from being adopted. See IHLO Report, supra note 43 (noting the ACFTU had
previously proposed such a change).
225. See Bronstein, supra note 22, at 208 (discussing the negative impacts of
temporary work).
226. See, e.g., Shanxisheng Meikuang Gongyeju Guanyu Meikuangjing Xia Yanjin
Shiyong Laowu Paiqian Renyuan de Tongzhi (
) [Shanxi Coal Mining Industry Bureau Notice on Strictly
Prohibiting the Use of Labor Dispatch for Mine Workers] (No 1529 promulgated
Jan. 23, 2010).
227. The initial LCL implementing rules issued in 2008 confirm that the labor
dispatch rules extend to these fields. LCL Implementing Provisions, supra note 118, art.
3.
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many of the same cost and risk-shifting advantages as indirect
hiring via a temp agency, and many Chinese companies have
already responded to the LCL amendments by substituting
outsourced workers for those previously sourced through labor
service agencies. 228 Although empirical evidence on the
magnitude of any shift is not yet available, the amendments’
implementing rules attempt to curtail this trend by bringing
independent contracting and other outsourcing relationships
within the scope of the labor dispatch rules if the company uses
a “labor dispatch hiring model”; in other words, if the direct
employer is not the firm for which the worker provides
services. 229 Of course, this concept itself is likely to foster
competing interpretations, which may limit its effectiveness.
In addition, the amendments’ implementing rules fail to
include proposed provisions that would have put a heavier
burden on user firms to monitor temp agencies. For example,
the proposed rules would have stipulated that the user firm
would be deemed the legal employer of the worker in the event
the labor services agency failed to enter into an employment
contract with the dispatched worker or if the user firm hired
dispatched workers in excess of the legal limits on labor
dispatch.230 Innovative incentives for self-regulation like these
are already part of the LCL itself and can be credited for its
success in motivating employers to comply with the employment
contract mandate. This approach was also adopted in Mexico’s
recent labor law reform, 231 and in China, as well, by local
governments in Liaoning and Chongqing. 232 If other local
governments were to follow suit, employers would incur
228. This observation is based on the personal experience of one of the authors.
229. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 27.
230. Aug. 8, 2013 Draft Labor Dispatch Regulations, arts. 14, 23, 37.
231. See Federal Labor Law, supra note 206, art. 13-16 (putting the burden on the
firm hiring outsourced workers and independent contractors to monitor any
contractor or temp agency’s legal compliance by making both firms jointly and
severally liable for any violation; the hiring firm may also risk the outsourced workers’
being considered standard full-time employees of the firm).
232. Liaoning Labor Regulations, supra note 134, art. 30 (deeming dispatched
employees to be direct hires if the user firm fails to execute a contract with the temp
agency). C.f. with Chongqing Labor Regulations, supra note 4, art. 30. Chongqing
modifies this list to include circumstances where the labor-using firm hires more than
fifty percent of its workforce via labor dispatch or uses temp hires for longer than two
years. Id.
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additional monitoring costs, but overall compliance would be
expected to improve significantly.
The rule would also
encourage dispatched workers to play an active role in enforcing
the LCL through litigation, which has proven to be a powerful
force motivating changes in employer practice since the initial
passage of the LCL.233 Concerns about the additional burden
on employers and the courts may explain why this rule was not
adopted in the new implementing rules,
Of course, some level of evasion of the LCL is perhaps
inevitable because many of the underlying challenges require a
normative shift and are less susceptible of a legislative solution.
One example is the heightened registered capital requirement.
The LCL’s initial registered capital requirement (RMB¥500,000)
was already a substantial increase over the pre-LCL level of
RMB¥30,000 (then, the default under the Company Law).
However, labor dispatch agencies were able to meet the new
standards by borrowing funds in order to register the business
and then draining the funds to repay the loan, leaving an empty
shell.234 Without concentrated efforts by local authorities, or the
introduction of some type of regulatory bonding or capital
maintenance rule (itself presumably difficult to police), these
practices are unlikely to change even though the new threshold
has again been dramatically increased.
Collective representation offers a potential solution to the
limits of top-down implementation but one that is constrained
in the Chinese context. Expanding avenues for active
representation of temp agency workers through unionization,
employee representative congresses, or participation in
collective bargaining agreements have in fact been advanced by
China’s national and local authorities in recent years. For
example, rules issued in 2012 require both state and non-state
employers to establish employee representative congresses
(“ERC”) under existing trade unions. These rules reinforce
233. See Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 9–10 (reporting some evidence that
managers perceive enforcement to have toughened since 2008 and linking improved
compliance in part to the heightened risk of employee litigation). One of the great
successes of the LCL, for example, was the strong incentives it created for employers to
enter into written employment contracts by stipulating that a worker serving without
one could be entitled to double damages and ultimately, deemed an indefinite term
hire as a matter of law.
234. 60 Million Temp Workers’ Rights, supra note 98.
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existing provisions on workplace representation under China’s
Company Law and local rules, and they require, for the first
time, that the ERC include representatives of dispatched
workers.235
However, because these measures depend on the viability of
the union itself, they have been seen as more of a public policy
statement than a firm requirement, and dispatched workers, as
well as many standard employees, do not yet have effective
avenues for workplace participation and collective voice. As in
the West, unionization levels are low for temporary workers, and
in China, some have been illegally barred from joining the trade
union of the labor-using firm.236 Some provincial trade union
federations are working to expand temp agency unionization
with aggressive targets.237 The ACFTU is also increasing efforts to
expand collective consultation at the regional and industry level
that would cover temp agencies and labor dispatch workers.
However, efforts to transform existing unions into true vehicles
for worker voice continue to meet strong resistance from
employers and skepticism by employees.238
D. The Benefits of Recursivity
The implicit assumption behind our discussion thus far has
been that recursivity should be reduced or eliminated. While
this would mean that employer practice has begun to conform
235 . See ACFTU et al. Qiye Minzhu Guanli Guiding (
)
[Provisions on the Democratic Management of Enterprises] art. 9 (issued and effective
Feb. 13, 2012). The ERC is a separate body from the trade union, which is responsible
for its operation.
236. See IHLO Report, supra note 43(citing statistics from a 2011 study of the
Shanghai Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, the China Enterprise Council (CEC),
and the MOHRSS reporting that only forty percent of all temp agencies are
unionized); Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 16 (reporting on the use of temp
workers at a Nokia factory in Dongguan, a major manufacturing center in
Guangdong); cf. Waas, supra note 16, at 59 (reporting that the unionization rate of
temporary workers in Europe is low); Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Overcoming Obstacles to
Worker Representation: Insights from the Temporary Agency Workforce, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
355 (2005-06) (surveying barriers to temporary worker organization in the United
States).
237 . See DONGGUAN DAILY, supra note 142 (reporting on sixty-five percent
unionization rate targets in Guangdong).
238. See Cooney et al., supra note 78, at 795–96 (discussing opposition of the
business community to provisions in the draft LCL that might have given unions veto
power over workplace rules).
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more closely to the demands of positive law, the continuation of
recursive cycles also offers a number of hidden benefits that
should be emphasized. First, the repetition of provisions
contained in earlier legislation during later recursive cycles
brings to light elements of the earlier reform that require
renewed policy emphasis and enforcement focus. As has been
widely recognized in the literature, the expressive effect of law
can be a powerful force in reshaping compliance incentives over
time, and the reiteration of existing standards serves this
function.239
Second, longer recursive cycles can give time for regulatory
distance to narrow.240 Policy tools that promote incrementalism,
such as transition periods, grandfathering, and phase-ins, are all
valuable policy tools for this reason.241 The two-year phase-in
period for the ten percent limit on dispatched workers is an
obvious example in the amendments’ implementing rules and
was intended to reduce the immediate impact of the rules on
unemployment, production levels, and labor relations. 242 Of
course, longer recursive cycles may also reflect deficiencies in
the underlying legislation and offer opportunity for
retrenchment, feeding the next recursive cycle. However, the
recursive nature of this process allows regulators and regulatees
to adjust to the requirements; successive expressions of the rule
will then respond to changes in the enforcement context and in
dominant norms among regulatees.
The history of labor law reform in China illustrates many of
the benefits of recursivity, despite the obstacles to
implementation that have been amply documented over the
past several decades. For example, many firms initially ignored
the Labor Law’s basic contracting rules and flaunted its
239. On the expressive function of law, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Law,
Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996);
Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the
Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938–39 (1991).
240. Certainly, if reforms are ineffective, recursive cycles may create greater
opportunity for evasion and resistance to build.
241. The LCL amendments provide that preexisting contracts will remain valid
but must be amended to conform to the equal pay requirement. Employers already
using dispatch workers and temp agencies who lack the required permit or business
license have one year from the effective date to comply with the new requirements.
LCL Amendments, supra note 2.
242 . See MOHRSS, supra note 164.
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prohibitions on abusive workplace practices, but a decade later,
by the time the LCL was passed, regulatory distance had begun
to narrow. Rising awareness of legal rights, space for bottom-up
enforcement, changes in public enforcement priorities, political
dynamics, and shifting market conditions with the LCL’s passage
all shaped this process, and all of these factors go some way in
explaining the progress that has been achieved in the
implementation of the LCL. Similarly, in 2008, labor dispatch
gave “breathing room” for firms pressed by the financial crisis
and a more litigious workforce to adjust. Now, the LCL
amendments foreclose labor dispatch as an automatic
alternative to full compliance, measures that would have
represented a vast regulatory distance if adopted during the
earlier recursive cycle and might have driven more overt
resistance from the business community. With greater clarity of
legal responsibility and a narrower regulatory distance at the
present time, prospects for effective implementation of the new
rules on labor dispatch may be brighter.
CONCLUSION
China is only one of many governments to introduce new
measures on dispatched workers in the past decade, reforms
that represent a clear retreat from the wholesale deregulation
and expansive approach toward nonstandard workers that
characterized earlier eras. Most have been put into place since
the start of the financial crisis. The 2008 European Union
Directive on Temporary Agency Work, for example, is designed
to “ensure the protection of temporary agency workers . . . by
ensuring that the principle of equal treatment [extends] to
temporary agency workers, and by recognizing temporary work
agencies as employers.”243 South Korea enacted its reforms in
2007,244 and Mexico passed a major reform of its Federal Labor

243. Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Temporary Agency Work, Nov. 19, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L237) 9, 11. See generally, Waas,
supra note 16 (analyzing the Directive).
244. See generally Yoo & Kang, supra note 16 (analyzing the reform’s effect on
dispatched hiring).
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Law in 2012 that includes many of the limits now incorporated
in the amended LCL.245
In the United States, as well, current debates over the
future
of
health
care
and
immigration
reform,
underemployment, and outsourcing have highlighted the
importance of nonstandard employment in the economy. They
have also sparked renewed attention among academics and
policymakers to the social costs and benefits of nonstandard
work. 246 Similar debates have engaged many governments
around the world in the past decade, each having to adapt
outdated legal forms to respond to the informalization of the
workplace.
The history of Chinese labor reform (and similar reforms in
the West as well)247 suggests that when new rules have attempted
to push companies to make significant changes far beyond the
level of current practice, decades may be required for the
reforms to take root. The LCL Amendments and their
implementing rules represent at least the third iteration in this
incremental process, and the lengthy transition period for their
implementation recognizes this reality. This most recent
experience underscores the utility of recursivity theory in
describing the complexity and dynamism of cycles of lawmaking
and implementation. It also emphasizes the relevance of new
concepts—underlying incentive structures and regulatory
distance—that might usefully be incorporated into future
research on legal reform cycles.
From a practical standpoint, the success of the latest
reforms is particularly important at this point in China’s reform
path as it works to develop a knowledge-driven, innovation-based
economy and deal with vast socio-economic disparities that may
pose a political threat to its leadership. Although the LCL
amendments cannot entirely foreclose future avenues of evasion
nor eliminate implementation barriers, the renewed effort to
245. Although it now gives employers the ability to retain workers on the basis of
seasonal or short-term contracts, the revised Federal Labor Law mandates written
employment contracts, prohibits firms from hiring an entire workforce through
intermediaries, and establishes other standards intended to make contracts for an
indefinite term the predominant form. See Federal Labor Law, supra note 198.
246. See, e.g. Will Obamacare Destroy Jobs? Health Reform May Make Americans Work
Less, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2013; Hill, supra note 151.
247. For a few obvious examples, see supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
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restore equality to dispatched workers and promote standard
hiring is a clear step forward in addressing these concerns. Even
if the amendments do not wind down the recursive cycle, they
can at least narrow the regulatory distance that will confront the
next phase of the reform process. They may also suggest lessons
for legislators and policymakers elsewhere who will shape the
future of labor and employment law to fit the needs of today’s
changing workforce.

